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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

ARCHITECTURE AND POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

by

Daniel J. Vinsand

December 2004

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Donald Abenheim
Hans-Eberhard Peters

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ARCHITECTURE AND POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

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Major, United States Army
B. ARCH., Iowa State University, 1994

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

Architecture and political power have related throughout history in various ways. The most prominent function of architecture, as well as other aesthetics, in the political realm has been to raise the national sentiment of a people. The aesthetics of architecture can be used to sell the ideas of a political system to the populace both by the creation of new architecture and the destruction of symbols contrary to the polity. The vehicle by which politics and architecture interrelate is shown to be the rhetoric surrounding the buildings. Exemplary of this is the nationalist period of Europe, when characters such as Stalin and Hitler manipulated aesthetics to develop national sentiment. Hence, in newly democratic Prague and Berlin we see a change in architecture and a rhetorical debate on the national value of styles, though the styles used in each case were not the same. Architectural style is therefore shown not to reflect a specific political theory, and national sentiment is again the key way in which architecture and politics relate.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This study opens with the question: why is there a relationship between architecture and national identity? To get to the eventual answer, it has been most important to define the question, what is the connection between architecture and politics? In order to narrow the investigation, the issue of national sentiment will be examined, as this has seemed to be the primary way in which politics and architecture interact. Politicians try to affect national sentiment through architecture, and they, among others, believe that architecture affects national sentiment and therefore politics. Furthermore, it will be shown that a specific style of architecture does not represent a specific polity, or put another way, the political rhetoric resulting from architecture relies on nurturing the rhetoric, not the nature of the style itself.

In Chapter II, the issue of national sentiment and architecture will be discussed broadly, in a wide geographic area, as well as through a broad range of time. Chapter III will further elucidate how aesthetics and architecture have been used by power brokers in Europe's past to create more power. The final chapter will compare and contrast the recent architecture of Prague and Berlin due to the recent political turmoil after the fall of communism.

Architecture relates to politics through national sentiment, and how many politicians and theorists have argued this point in the past. It follows then, that one must argue how, in fact, national sentiment relates to architecture and vice versa. Chapter II will show that architectural style has been argued by some as indicative of a specific political will, but the theorists differ as to how the architectural style should be used and which one is appropriate for democracy. Then the argument will be made that rhetoric is the key to this connection as opposed to the aesthetic style of the architecture.

Chapter III will discuss more specifically how the interplay of architecture and politics has performed through Europe's history. It will be shown that there

has been a relationship between aesthetics and politics throughout history, and that the rhetorical link has been visible as well. From the age of religious dominance in Europe through the Enlightenment and into the modern age the links can be seen. Politicians have in fact learned from their predecessors about how best to utilize the arts all the way to Hitler who had a great understanding of the link between aesthetics, national sentiment, and power.¹

The final examination of this thesis is the way in which political rhetoric as it relates to architecture has altered since the political change of 1989. This will be examined through observation of Prague and Berlin and the rhetoric surrounding their architecture.

Berlin is an interesting case due to the political culture of Germany. It is an accelerated case of how politics may well end up in much of central and eastern Europe. Additionally, it is an odd case in that it has a poor economy surrounding it, but a good economy supporting it. Finally, Berlin has the advantage of the extra real estate left by the fall of the Wall. These qualities make it an interesting contrast to Prague. The most striking contrast, though, will be that in addressing Berlin, it is most apropos to address the public architecture there, as that is where a preponderance of the debate has fallen. This lends itself more ably to the political debate, while maintaining a good amount of public debate as well.

Prague has had less change perpetuated by political entities, but the change of private architecture has been interesting. Another interesting contrast between the two capitals is that the amount of wartime destruction between the two is significantly different. In fact, through the Cold war in Prague, there were a few areas that remained in ruin from the war, while in Berlin major reconstruction was necessary. Hence a taste of the new was already in the mouths of Berliners in 1989. In Prague, on the other hand, the new buildings were primarily in the

¹ George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich*, Howard Fertig, Inc. pbk.ed. (New York: H. Fertig, 2001).

outskirts of the city. A further difference between the two cases is that Berlin had instant political change in 1990 while the Czech Republic has had more of a slow process. Additionally, Berlin has significant financial aid and political and architectural input from western Germany, while Czech's patronage comes from the remainder of the EU, along with the remainder of the new members. Finally, the openings that were made available by the wall itself were not made available in the majority of Prague, causing more sprawl than reconsolidation.

The history of the two capitals is also in some ways interrelated. Germany has had a dubious recent history which they would like to put behind them. They don't want to forget the past, while they don't want to relive it every day, either. Most of all, they do not want to recall the fascism of their recent past.² The Czech Republic is similar in that they want to put their communist past behind them, but the embarrassment of the past and fear of return is not so strong.

² Michael Z. Wise, *Capital Dilemma : Germany's Search for a New Architecture of Democracy*, 1st ed. (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998), 190.

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II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF ARCHITECTURE AND POLITICAL POWER

National sentiment is the way in which architecture relates most commonly to politics. People use architecture to try to raise their national emotions and link their population together. Indeed some argue that government should take advantage of the relationship to sentiment, taking the most positive control over national architecture. In fact, Neil Leach, an architect and prolific writer on architectural theory, argues in the introduction to one of his books, *Architecture and Revolution*, that Berlin is being ruined by uncontrolled entrepreneurs and implies that they should be controlled by a central political structure.³ It has also been argued that the new style of architecture for the Soviet Union was more repugnant than the new politics the style was supposed to embody.⁴

Several examples exist in Europe of how this desire to control architectural style been felt by various rulers. In Poznan, Poland, during occupation by Prussia, the Prussians “constructed buildings stylistically alien to the city’s architecture to emphasize the greatness of Bismarck’s Prussia.”⁵ Furthermore Hitler planned massive changes to the architecture of Germany to reflect his great Reich and diverted resources from the war to accomplish this.⁶ Also, Nicolae Ceausescu intended to “wipe out Romanian national identity,” using architecture during the Cold War using a combination of centralized city planning and architectural design.⁷ He intended to create a fresh start for what he thought was a stagnant Romania. Each of these examples demonstrates how

³ Neil Leach in Neil Leach ed., *Architecture and Revolution: Contemporary Perspectives on Central and Eastern Europe* (London ; New York: Routledge, 1999), 4.

⁴ Anders Åman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era : an aspect of Cold War history* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 49.

⁵ Malgorzata Omilanowska in Nicola Gordon Bowe, *Art and the National Dream: The Search for Vernacular Expression in Turn-of-the-Century Design* (Blackrock, Co. Dublin, Ireland: Irish Academic Press, 1993), 100.

⁶ Paul B. Jaskot, *The Architecture of Oppression: The SS, Forced Labor and the Nazi Monumental Building Economy* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2000), 207.

⁷ Renata Salecl in Neil Leach ed., *Architecture and Revolution*, 102.

under a totalitarian regime, politics can certainly affect architecture. Further, it shows that these rulers strongly believed that architecture could affect politics in the form of national sentiment. They each wanted to improve their national cohesion through the creation of a national architecture.

These extreme examples simply illustrate the historical application of a common theory that architecture can affect national sentiment. The key to this relationship seems to be in the area of remembrance. “. . . Ancient values are considered to have a special importance for current civilization, to regain a lost – or supposedly lost – Golden Age.”⁸ John Ruskin, an art historian and theorist, noted the connection between architecture and remembrance in 1849 in his celebrated treatise on architecture. He suggested that, “when we build, let us think that we build for ever. Let it not be for present delight, nor for present use alone.”⁹ Further in relation to the longevity of architecture he notes that, “Through its longevity, architecture further documents the history of successive generations as it witnesses the deeds of men and their suffering, and accumulates ‘that golden stain of time’ which gives it the gift ‘of language’.”¹⁰ This longevity is surely a source that politicians want to ride on to increase their own longevity.

And this remembrance associated with architecture has been used by politicians to increase national sentiment to political ends. Indeed, it is the remembrance of styles past that seems to be the basis of many past rises in nationalism, including that of the Nazis.¹¹ It is important here to segue way into a discussion of style, then, as it has been addressed by nations. It is important because national sentiment and historical style are not necessarily linked.

⁸ Janos Gerle in Nicola Gordon Bowe, *Art and the National Dream*, 144.

⁹ John Ruskin, *The Seven Lamps of Architecture* (New York: Dover Publications, 1989), 186.

¹⁰ Paul Hatton in Michael Wheeler and Nigel Whiteley, *The Lamp of Memory : Ruskin, Tradition, and Architecture* (Manchester, UK ; New York; New York, NY, USA: Manchester University Press; Distributed exclusively in the USA and Canada by St. Martin's Press, 1992), 134.

¹¹ George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, 252.

A. A STYLE FOR DEMOCRACY

In developing a democratic architecture, it seems the case of style is important to many. Some argue that the style of ancient Greece, being the cradle of democracy, best represents their polity.¹² Others emphasize the openness of glass structures represented in the International or Modernist styles.¹³ This study counters that Modernist, Postmodernist, Greek Revival or International Style could all be representative of democracy.¹⁴ The determining factor is the will of the people. If people in the Czech Republic decide that they should display International, Classical, Modern, Cubist or some form of Czech national style, the people have then spoken. In fact, a diversity of architecture is more indicative of a diverse people than a monotonous style. It is the purpose of Chapter IV, then, to show how two examples of post-Soviet polities have demonstrated their democratic politics in their architecture.

Alex de Tocqueville was skeptical of democratic style and more specifically the fate of the arts in a democracy. He argued that in the United States, democracy has in fact forced the decline of high art. His argument went that a decrease in aristocracy leads to a decline of fine art through a lack of patronage. He further stated that only art and education could provide the synthesis needed to evolve a more enlightened and cultivated electorate.¹⁵ A current example of how this has reared up in today's politics is in the United States National Endowment for the Arts. As politicians began to take an interest in it, the Endowment began to focus more on dissemination of art than encouragement of better standards in art. In fact as funding for the Endowment

¹² Deyan Sudjic and Helen Jones, *Architecture and Democracy* (London: Laurence King, 2001), 20-21.

¹³ Michael Wise, *Capital Dilemma*, 190.

¹⁴ Each of these styles is, in fact exemplified in various parliaments throughout the democratic countries of the world. The German Parliament in Berlin is a modern reconstruction of the old Baroque building; London's Westminster as well as the parliament buildings of Canada and Hungary are in the Gothic style; and the Bonn capital was in the International Style, according to Deyan Sudjic with Helen Jones, *Architecture and Democracy* (Glasgow: Laurence King Publishing, 1999).

¹⁵ Robert Brustein in Arthur M. Melzer et al., *Democracy & the Arts* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 11-12.

went up, people took notice of it and argued their aesthetic beliefs to the politicians who tamed the endowment, and brought its money to less controversial artists.¹⁶

There are many arguments, though, that despite these stylistic limitations and concerns a style is essential in democratic architecture. What is called for by most authors is a new architecture for the new times.¹⁷ Daniel Libeskind argues that architecture should neither erase the past nor revisit the past, but should rest at a happy medium.¹⁸ In fact, postmodern architecture is a style appropriate to this idea, because “from classicism to modernism, the various aesthetic doctrines all maintained that art reflects the single, eternal truth about life. In the postmodern age, such confidence is disparaged as naïve, dangerous, or both.”¹⁹

The postmodernists are not the only ones to argue for a style, though. Hungary is an example of how people are arguing for a national architecture derived from the peasant vernacular. Of course there is much debate over what peasant form is truly national when the peasants borrow from parallel societies – Russian architecture in this case.²⁰ In another nod to a national style, writing on Turkish national architecture in the 1930s Sibel Bozdoğan says that the Turks rejected both the Ottoman past and the western ideals in their pursuit of a national style. They arrived at their own form – “a program of ‘nationalizing the modern’.”²¹ This led to a combination of modern and vernacular.

This variance of styles is the first indicator that a specific architectural style and a corresponding political structure are not related. Many further arguments

¹⁶ Ibid., 12.

¹⁷ See Bernard Tschumi “Disjunctions,” in Neil Leach, *Architecture and Revolution*, 146-149, and the conclusion to Anders Åman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era*.

¹⁸ Daniel Libeskind in Neil Leach ed., *Architecture and Revolution*, 127-129.

¹⁹ Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman, in Melzer et al., *Democracy & the Arts*, 8-9.

²⁰ Janos Gerle in Nicola Gordon Bowe, *Art and the National Dream*, 213.

²¹ Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building : Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2001), 240-241.

have supported this. The argument is that it is not the aesthetics of architecture that is the political part, but the actual use of space.²² “What the new Europe needs . . . is a new approach to architectural theory more responsive to the fluidity and flux of today’s society, one that is more in tune with the technological conditions of our contemporary existence.”²³ Inevitably both national vernacular and international styles are combined when considering a national style.²⁴ Examples of this phenomenon of mixing architectural styles are world wide. In Japan, for instance, in the post World War era, architects arrived at a national style which joined their traditional style with modern methods, developing a new style for themselves.²⁵

The bottom line reached by most, then, is that style is not indicative of polity. Some authors beg to differ, though. Indeed, Ruskin argued throughout his work that Gothic architecture was the most appropriate for a national style. This style played to his theme of architecture of remembrance and furthered it by saying that this architecture recalled the good things about the national past of Britain. And the postmodernists, while arguing that a confluence of architectural styles is necessary imply that some other styles are inappropriate for democracy.

This multiplicity of opinions demonstrates in the end that no one style is indicative of democracy, and I would further argue that the same can be said of any polity. It must be noted, though, that style still has a political role to play. For example, while the Gothic does not imply democracy by itself, as would be argued by the Japanese, perhaps it is appropriate for England, as Ruskin argued a century and a half ago. Nations would do themselves a service by developing a national architectural style, and this style is all that remains in question. Indeed the Japanese, British, Romanians, and Hungarians as well as the Germans and

²² Neil Leach in Neil Leach ed., 119-120 .

²³ Neil Leach in Neil Leach ed.

²⁴ Lawrence J. Vale, *Architecture, Power, and National Identity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 273.

²⁵ Cherie Wendelken-Mortensen, *Living with the Past: Preservation and Development in Japanese Architecture and Town Planning* , (PhD Dissertation, MIT, 1994)

Czechs have been developing and debating their national style over the past decade. The connection, then, between style and polity is rhetorical.

B. THE RHETORICAL LINK

The nurture of a rhetorical link is primary in the connection between architecture and politics. There have been multiple cases of how this link is established, maintained and changed, and it is this malleability of the rhetoric that this chapter addresses. The style of architecture can stay the same, and indeed the form of political space created by a piece can remain unchanged, but the surrounding political rhetoric can change the meaning of a building completely.

Structures create political rhetoric, but the problem is that the rhetoric created is not under the control of the creator. Parliamentary buildings are the obvious example of architecture is intended to create political rhetoric.

It is argued that parliamentary buildings and spaces (1) preserve cultural values of the polity over time; (2) articulate contemporaneous political attitudes and values; and (3) contribute to the formation of political culture. . . . It is concluded that the advent of television broadcasting of parliamentary sessions may make these architectural features even more important in perpetuating, manifesting and shaping political culture.²⁶

This statement from the *British Journal of Political Science* sums up how architecture is intended to create political rhetoric. The structure should make a statement which will be indelible upon the society. However, this interpretation of the art is subject to reinterpretation.

The obvious example of this reinterpretation is that of the "People's Palace" in Bucharest. Ceausescu demolished a great swath of the old capital city to create a monumental piece of architecture. His intent was to show the world the greatness of Romania and the Romanian people through a fantastic capitol complex. A great boulevard was cut, four kilometers long, through the city, trees were planted to line the avenue, and at the end the second biggest

²⁶ Charles T. Goodsell, "The Architecture of Parliaments: Legislative Houses and Political Culture," *British Journal of Political Science* 18, no. 3 (1988): 287.

building (next to the Pentagon) in the world was constructed.²⁷ Ceausescu intended to “wipe out Romanian national identity,” and replace it with a communist identity.²⁸

There followed great debate as to the fate of the Palace after the fall of communism in 1989.²⁹ The people discussed what must be done with the building. Should it be razed for what it represents? Of course, the answer reached was “no.” Instead it was merely transformed rhetorically into the “People’s House,” demonstrating that whatever political content might seem to be invested in architectural form may subsequently be erased or rewritten.”^{30 31}

Another example of rhetorical transformation is “Stalin’s Palace” in Warsaw. “Its actual appearance has been less significant than its hybridic ability to encode different meanings.” These include Western, Polish, feminine, subversive and capitalist, among others.³² Essentially, the People of Poland have done the same rhetorical and physical adaptation as the Romanians did. The building has been changed in internal form and used to house a “slick” convention center, a casino, the World Business Center, Coca-Cola Poland; some very non-communist spaces. The people argue both that this capitalist use of the building is poetic in its response to the Stalinist times, and that it is inappropriate for this representation of the communist past. Using a comparison of new democratic architecture and totalitarian architecture created during the cold war, this example shows that there is no connection between style and ideology, beyond the rhetorical link.³³

²⁷ Renata Salecl in Neil Leach ed., 92-108.

²⁸ Ibid., 102

²⁹ Ibid., 100

³⁰ Ibid., 104

³¹ Neil Leach in Neil Leach ed., 118

³² Magdalena Zaborowska, “The Height of (Architectural) Seduction: Reading the “Changes” through Stalin’s Palace in Warsaw, Poland.” *Journal of Architectural Education* (2001), 210.

³³ Magdalena Zaborowska, 205-207.

So though rhetoric is the key, it is not as powerful of an ally as politicians might hope. Indeed the permanence they sometimes seek through their projects is every so often transformed into something they would not agree with, and now and then it may backfire to be a symbol of the political poverty of their regime. This is due to the changing nature of politics. In previous times, it was argued that architecture should be read like a book, and for the initiated it could.³⁴ This is not to say that a person could observe the façade of a church and see “the quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog.” What was intended was that the educated person could see what the artist intended with specific details or “words”, then put some thought into whether the architect had made a worthwhile “statement” with the building.

In modern times, though, buildings are subject to broader interpretation, in that the uninitiated are reading them, and the opinion of the uninitiated matters. As de Tocqueville speculated, art and architecture have become subject to mass scrutiny and mass appeal, and artists have reacted by creating an architecture for the masses. In many ways it is not feasible to create public architecture that does not speak to the masses. In a democratic society, their opinion counts to the politicians. Private architecture is only withheld by building codes, though in many places, these too control aesthetics.

Most theorists agree that rhetoric is the link between architecture and politics. For instance, Leach, who edited a book about architecture and politics in eastern Europe said, “Architecture can only be politicized through association, thereby challenging the commonly held belief that architectural form is in and of itself political.”³⁵ He adds that “Political content does not reside in architectural form; it is merely grafted on to it by a process that is strictly allegorical.”³⁶ His final paragraph sums up the connection of politics and architecture quite well.

³⁴ Paul Hatton in Wheeler and Whiteley, *The Lamp of Memory*, 123-124

³⁵ Neil Leach ed., 6

³⁶ Neil Leach in Neil Leach ed., 118

It is only perhaps if we are to understand architecture, along with the other visual arts, as offering a form of backdrop against which to forge some new political identity, that we might recognize a political role for architecture, albeit indirect. For this backdrop, although neutral in itself, will always have some political 'content' projected on to it.³⁷

C. CONCLUSION – ARCHITECTURE AND POLITICAL POWER

In explaining the link between architecture and politics, the argument is twofold. First, contrary to architectural and political theorists there is no link between a specific architectural style and a specific polity. This theme is reiterated again and again throughout the relevant literature. Second, the link that does exist is that of rhetoric, and it is here that politics plays a great role in the creation of and design of architecture. This rhetoric is malleable, though, as I have noted earlier. The question remains then, if the designer of a building is not in control of the subsequent reading of the building, then who is? Perhaps no one, but in the remaining investigation, I hope to reveal some alternative thoughts on how this question may be answered. In that pursuit, we now turn to the history of architecture and politics in Europe.

³⁷ Ibid., 122

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III. THE ROLE OF AESTHETICS IN POWER BUILDING IN EUROPE

This chapter will show how symbolism was used through art and architecture by the powerful in Europe to advance their political agenda. Though there are many other symbolic ways that people tried to advance their politics that will not be elucidated here, the purpose of this argument is to narrow the study to the fine arts of architecture, art, and sculpture and how these aesthetic tools contributed to the advancement of power in Europe.³⁸ This broadening of the scope of investigation to include the other fine arts will provide adequate background about how Architecture and Politics relate through aesthetics. This history will begin with the power of the church and progress through the secularization of the enlightenment and end with the “secular religion” of nationalism.³⁹

The argument of how the powerful used the aesthetics of symbols begins with the fact that political theory is based on ideas, which can only be conceptualized in the mind. In order to advance this idea, the power holders used concrete objectifications of the idea, in other words symbols. “Symbols were visible, concrete objectifications of the myths in which people could participate.”⁴⁰ Thus, religion used symbols as described through the remainder of the chapter, to bring their theology to the people, to give them something tangible to witness in their faith. Furthermore, secularists as well as the nationalists used aesthetics in later years to express their ideas in tangible form. Thus even in architecture aesthetics were primary, even though function plays a

³⁸ George Mosse describes many of the ways that Nazi Germany advanced their power using aesthetics and symbolism. Specifically, see *Nationalization of the Masses* and George L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: reshaping the memory of the world wars* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). Frederic Spotts, *Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics* (Woodstock: Overlook Press, 2003) is another extensive source on the subject.

³⁹ The reference to “secular religion” is found in many studies of nationalism, including Hagen Schulze, *States, Nations, and Nationalism: from the Middle Ages to the Present*, (Oxford, UK ; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell, 1996), 150, 152, and George Mosse, *Nationalization of the Masses*, 5-6.

⁴⁰ George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, 7.

role there as well. In other words form did not follow function in political or religious architecture.

There were three religious and political power bases in which aesthetic instruments were used to further their purpose that will be covered in this chapter, and they will be addressed in chronological order. First, organized religions used aesthetics to promote religion to the masses, or in some cases to promote the superiority of one religion over another. Next, in the revolutionary era of Europe, the enlightened used aesthetics to assist in the change from Church power to secular power. Finally, in the 20th century, new political entities that were not possible in previous eras promote the new religion of nationalism.⁴¹ The deepest study here will be on that of the nationalists, not because they have had a monopoly on the use of aesthetics in the development of power, but because the examples there are the most widely available to the author.

A. CHRISTIANITY USES AESTHETICS TO FURTHER THEIR RELIGION

1. The Early Church

The dominance of Christian aesthetic culture began after the fourth century, when Roman Architecture, literature and institutions lost their uniting role for the citizens of Europe. The slow but obvious decline of the Roman Empire left a political vacuum that needed to be filled, but some of the culture remained in Christianity, the Latin language and Roman law as it had been preserved in the writings of the church.⁴² So afterwards, Christianity became the religion of the land, and gained great political power.

Christianity thence created some of the most recognizable art and architecture that we know today. Art and architecture require sponsorship or money, and during these times the Church held vast amounts of property and

⁴¹ An overview of how these religious eras played a part in Europe is seen in René Rémond, *Religion and Society in Modern Europe* (Oxford ; Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 1999). The era of church power can be seen alternately in Euan Cameron, *Early Modern Europe: an Oxford History* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) and Owen Chadwick, *The Reformation*, [1st ed.], reprinted with revisions (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England ; New York: Penguin Books, 1990). Nationalism is covered in two books by George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses* and George L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*.

⁴² Euan Cameron, *Early Modern Europe*, 10.

wealth, and therefore sponsored a large amount of art. St. Peter's basilica is exemplary of this. The basilica itself is recognizable to most, in name if not in form, and the nearby paintings of Michelangelo in the Sistine Chapel are some of the best known art works in the world. The art had many symbolic interpretations, among them that the church had demonstrated authority through the creation of artworks. "Mythical symbolism leads to an objectification of feelings; myth objectifies and organizes human hopes and fears and metamorphosizes them into persistent and durable works."⁴³

To create the artistic symbols needed by the Church, then, it encouraged the creation of art and declared how inspiration came from divine roots. The church defined the ability to artistically express as a gift from God in the following manner. Art in these early times was seen as one of the divine gifts to man, because only man was given the power to transform his environment using *techne*. Like man could release the chair from the wood of a tree, he could release art from paint and canvas or a colonnade from blocks of stone. Since many of these arts had not penetrated outside of Europe, this was a way that Europeans felt they had been chosen by God in their early history.⁴⁴

One early example of the interplay of ecclesiastic politics and aesthetic expression is in the maps of the early middle ages. Some of the first surviving maps were designed to illustrate the conceptual divisions between the continents. Life began in Asia which was drawn on the top of the map, and then Europe and Africa were beneath, with Jerusalem in the center. (See Figure 1.) "They showed not so much our place upon the surface of the planet, as our relationship as races to one another."⁴⁵ Function was subordinate to form, as we shall see throughout this chapter. Art thus followed religious beliefs and religion furthered their teachings through art.

⁴³ David Bidney, "Myth, Symbolism and Truth," *Myth, A Symposium*, ed. Thomas A Sebeok (Bloomington, Ind., and London, 1958), 14, quoted in George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, 210.

⁴⁴ Euan Cameron, *Early Modern Europe*, 15.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.



Figure 1. The 'Mappa Munidi' T-map drawn in the early thirteenth century. Jerusalem may be seen at the center of the map with Asia at the top and the other known continents below. From Euan Cameron, *Early Modern Europe*, 3.

The importance of architecture for Christianity was not new. "The idea of the 'sacred space,' a place which could be filled only with symbolic activity, dates back to primitive time and pagan worship, later taken over by Christians. Such space was considered, throughout history, as a necessary prerequisite to liturgical action."⁴⁶ An example of how seriously the Christians took the development of architecture is the construction of St. Peter's basilica in Rome.

⁴⁶ George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, 208.

The Pope spent more money than he had on hand to construct the new basilica, and used 'indulgences' to finance what he needed. The indulgences involved trading absolution for money and wound up being one of the problems that stirred the Reformation.⁴⁷ Thus a noteworthy risk was taken, merely to build an aesthetic symbol for Christianity. Aesthetics were again superior to rationality.

2. The Reformation

The Reformation was a kind of ideological civil war within Christianity; hence some of the weapons used were aesthetic. Different sects, such as the Calvinists and Humanists, had different ideologies sprouting from new philosophical interpretations of the Bible. These different viewpoints were expressed aesthetically as well as philosophically, of course and hence affected aesthetics, in some cases quite seriously. Ideology again used aesthetic tools.

The Reformed church changed church architecture along with doctrine to indicate different beliefs. For instance, the belief that prayer was as important as preaching led to a reading platform at the same level as the pulpit as opposed to the previous norm of a pulpit higher than the reader. This is an example of an aesthetic change as an expression of the differing theologies, and served as an outward demonstration of how different they were.⁴⁸ In other words, if the tradition was to be changed in the liturgy, it would be made plain by expressing it in the aesthetics of the church as well.

Hence, in the late 17th century Protestant churches no longer looked like Catholic churches. In fact a Protestant, upon entering a catholic church would find a "strange or repellant or unintelligible atmosphere."⁴⁹ This was due to the Protestant disconnection with Christianity of the earlier times. This type of differentiation was intended and was likely welcomed by the Protestants as well as the Catholics. They would want their people to see the differentiation that they were expressing theologically.

⁴⁷ Owen Chadwick, *The Reformation*, 41-42.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 422.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 369.

Another symbolic difference that came with the Reformation was in the use of the church building. In the earlier days under Catholicism, the church was not only the place for religious gathering, but the main secular structure in many communities through the middle ages. It was sometimes used for “business, for a law court, a market, a school, a promenade, a feast.” This was somewhat understandable, as the church was in many cases the sole public building in the town. However, there was a change of attitude during the Reformation that solemnified the space and it became less acceptable to conduct secular business in the church.⁵⁰

One further expression of religious difference within Christianity was expressed less productively. This aesthetic expression of faith was the destruction of the monuments of the old religion. Calvinists destroyed many church symbols because in their strict interpretation of the scriptures, these symbols were idol worship.⁵¹ Due to their severe understanding of texts, zealous reaction to the interpretation, and just as importantly, the need to show an aesthetic difference from their predecessor, many artifacts were destroyed.

Later, in the era of the Counter-reformation, the Laudians (or English Puritans) replaced many of these artifacts, and reintroduced art to the churches. Many hidden artifacts were brought out of the cupboards and some of the destroyed symbols were recreated.⁵² Again, in the counterreformation, the theological change was noted in a change of the aesthetics of the church.

This theological and aesthetic turn of events is a demonstration of how the difference in view on art was not limited to the Protestants versus the Catholics. The different Protestant sects also differed on how they viewed the consumption of art both in the church and among the congregation. Obviously, the aforementioned divine gift of art was disputed between these sects of the Protestants. Another example of this conflict was within the Humanist sect of

⁵⁰ Ibid., 425-428.

⁵¹ Ibid., 362-363.

⁵² Ibid., 225-227.

Protestantism. Though they had a common title, within the sect the southern and northern Humanists differed, and art was a part of it. "Italian humanism was literary, artistic, philosophical, whereas northern humanism was religious, even theological," meaning that the northerners of England France and Germany shunned the use of art more than the Italians. This was due in part to the Italian humanists' romantic attachment to their past and the artistic trappings thereof.⁵³

Of course, there were also aesthetic differences expressed from the religions outside of Christianity, and especially where these lands geographically met the Christian lands. The most glaring example is that of the Muslim Ottoman Empire. Despite the fact that the Ottomans showed a good amount of religious tolerance at the time, allowing Christians to continue their religious practices after conquest of their lands, they made aesthetic changes to Christian symbols.⁵⁴ Some churches were destroyed by them upon takeover of Christian lands, though others were converted into mosques and some were left to the Christians.⁵⁵ This alteration of symbolic power demonstrated the supremacy of their society over the conquered one, and perhaps the superiority of their religion.

This take over of the symbols by a new faith was not always complete. The church of St. Sophia is an example as noted by Owen Chadwick, a historian and prolific author of Christian history:

Though the noblest of Byzantine churches, St Sophia, had been given minarets and converted into a mosque, Christians continued to visit the holy places there, and Turks joined with them in their reverence for the doors made from the wood of the ark or for the holy well covered with a stone from the well of Bethlehem.⁵⁶

The fact that the symbols maintained their value to each faith no matter what the building surrounded them represented demonstrates how religious

⁵³ Ibid., 30.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 349-55. Though Christians did not have all of the same rights as Muslims, they were treated better than they had treated the Jews, Amos Elon, *The Pity of It All: a History of the Jews in Germany, 1743-1933* 1sted. (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2002).

⁵⁵ Owen Chadwick, *The Reformation*, 354-55.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 354.

symbolism was not subject to the geography or buildings that surrounded it, it was durable. In other words, the Ottoman takeover of Constantinople was not a complete takeover of the Christian symbols there; in the destruction of symbols, each one must be addressed individually.

In the era of religious dominance of politics, theology supported the creation of art, in order to advance their views. Art was used as a physical expression of a cognitive idea and hence made the idea more available to the masses. In the churches, these symbols were perceived as important affecters on the congregation. Sects, as well as separate religions, used the tool of aesthetics in this manner, by both symbolic and actual destruction of rival aesthetics and creation of their own. Later, the secular movement that went along with political revolution used the same methods.

B. THE ENLIGHTENMENT USES AESTHETICS

During the age of the enlightenment, industrialization and political revolution, there was a drive to rid politics of religious influence. This period of secularization used some of the aesthetic methods of religion to move the populace to their point of view.

As in the earlier times, the destruction of symbols was not always literal.⁵⁷ Some ecclesiastic buildings were demolished, but some were merely taken over during the era of secularization in Europe. For example, some Churches were turned over to the prison authority or to the Military, saved by a fortunate side effect of the secularization of Church property. In other cases they were in fact razed in the name of progress and city planning, intentionally saying that the use of the space for a new industrial society was more important than the religious symbolism of the building itself.⁵⁸ This negated their previous religious significance, whether by redesignation or by destruction.

⁵⁷ See the aforementioned examples of the shared symbols in the Hagia Sophia, the dedicated use of churches in the Reformation, the removal and replacement of religious symbols in the Reformation and Counter-reformation, and the change of the interior design of churches by the Protestants.

⁵⁸ René Rémond, *Religion and Society in Modern Europe*, 145.

Another way the secular invaded the churches was political. As they had done before the Reformation, the churches would be used for the political furtherance of the regime. In eastern Europe, for example, Churches spread farther than bureaucrats could effectively control or extract from the populace. Therefore, the politicians used the churches as adjuncts to state authority, to distribute state information. For example, Hapsburg churches were required to announce official edicts at the Sunday sermons.⁵⁹

Of course, secular forces used aesthetics to promote their power as well, even in the era of Christian primacy. For example, in 1530 the Medici family were restored to power in Florence and “proceeded to secure their power by many means: . . . the construction of a bastioned fortress to cow the city and an imposing block of government offices from which to administer the state . . . and lavish patronage of the arts.”⁶⁰ The fortress is a good example of the use of architecture by the Medici: “The Fortezza da Basso at Florence was built by the Medici from 1534 to overawe the citizens of the once fiercely republican city over which they ruled as princes from 1530.”⁶¹ (Figure 2.) This demonstrates how the function of a building can lead to impressive aesthetics that will achieve the symbolic goals of the architect. It was difficult to tell how effective these attempts were, though here it is only important to note that the powerful, secular as well as ecclesiastical, attempted to affect political change through aesthetics. They attempted various methods to do this, which were built on through the centuries as we shall see through the development from church art to nationalist art.

Paris has two important examples of how during the time of secularization and industrialization people attempted to overshadow the Christian symbols of the city. The first is the present day symbol of Paris, the Eiffel Tower. It was “intended to be the monumental reply on the Paris skyline to the Sacré Coeur on

⁵⁹ Euan Cameron, *Early Modern Europe*, 330.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 117.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 111.



Figure 2. Fortezza de Basso, Florence. From Euan Cameron, *Early Modern Europe*, 111.

the summit of Montmartre.”⁶² It was modern steel construction in the burgeoning age of industrialism versus the classic stone masonry of the past. Then, in a statutory example of art representing secularization in Paris, the municipal council erected a statue of Chevalier de la Barre, a victim of religious intolerance, near the Sacré Coeur basilica and named the street leading to the basilica after him.⁶³ This was an even more direct symbolic assault on the dominance of the Catholic Church during the time of secularization in France.

C. NATIONALISM USES AESTHETICS

The remainder of the chapter will be dedicated to how the new religion of nationalization followed in the aesthetic footsteps of the Church and the

⁶² René Rémond, *Religion and Society in Modern Europe*, 146.

⁶³ Ibid., 146.

secularization movement in Europe, using aesthetics to develop political power.⁶⁴ Some people in the new societies wanted to nationalize the people into a homogenous whole. They used common national history to do this, and hence they used many of the aesthetic tools already utilized by the church in earlier centuries. In other words, they destroyed the symbols of their rivals and created symbols of their own.

In the view of the nationalists history played a vital role, and so the church was not only used for a model of how to gain power through aesthetics, but was itself used as a symbol. The Church was a symbol of the heritage of the people, and could hence be used by the nationalists to unite the masses. As noted before “Mythical symbolism leads to an objectification of feelings.”⁶⁵ Therefore the existing symbol of the church itself was a logical place to begin the representation of history.

The nationalists used symbolism like the church had in order to unite the people into a common history despite reservations they may have had about allowing this parallel power to perpetuate.⁶⁶ The nationalists even imitated the Christian liturgy in songs, speeches, and celebrations. In fact they learned from the past use of aesthetics and symbolism through all sources and tried to amalgamate the best of all worlds. They imitated the Protestant focus on song, sermon, and common prayer while using the Catholic tendency to symbolism, aesthetics and architecture.⁶⁷ This imitation was presented to the people in the form of national festivals where they marched in national formations, sang national songs and heard national speeches while surrounded by the nature of the nation and/or the national architecture. In the case of the Soviet Union in the inter-war years, the “national” festivals of May Day and the October

⁶⁴ George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, 252. See especially pp. 5-7 for discussion of nationalism as religion.

⁶⁵ David Bidney, “Myth, Symbolism and Truth”.

⁶⁶ The German nationalists’ desire to decrease the power of the church is noted throughout George Mosse’s chapter on public festivals in George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, 73-99.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 77-81.

Revolution were used to replace the religious festivals. They basically invented traditions.⁶⁸ Though these parallels were obvious to the people who witnessed the festivals, the people were not put off by it and enjoyed the new national liturgy.

Architecture was a complimentary aesthetic to the festivals. As the Catholics needed a place for the mass, festivals needed a place to be staged, and the nationalists intended for national architecture to take the place of churches. The architect Theodor Fischer wrote that “we must create buildings through which men can once more be formed into a higher cosmic community.”⁶⁹ George Mosse, a historian and prolific writer on the subject of nationalism continues that, “National consciousness is best expressed through liturgy and symbols.”⁷⁰ In the case of the Soviet Union, the message conveyed was that the Union would endure.⁷¹ Hence, architectural symbolism has great importance for nationalism as it had for the Church, the reformation and secularization beforehand.

Symbolism was key, as we have seen, to making ideas into tangible things the people could witness. Indeed the new religion of nationalization “relied upon a variety of myths and symbols which were based on the longing to escape from the consequences of industrialization.”⁷² They wanted to use the old methods to proceed into the future and to create for themselves a new religion in the eyes of the people, that of nationalism. To examine how this relationship between aesthetics and nationalism developed, we must first define nationalism, then describe the history. Finally, we will extensively examine the way that

⁶⁸ Anders Åman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era*, 34. The use of “national” to refer to the Soviet Union is a loose interpretation of the word. The term is used in this text, though, as the Soviet Union was trying to develop a nation and Soviet nationalism in the same way that the French and British brought together previously disparate nationalities in their states.

⁶⁹ Theodor Fischer paraphrased in George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, 67.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 136.

⁷¹ Anders Åman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era*, 39

⁷² George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses.*, 6.

national sentiment, as described in Chapter II, was used by nationalism and how aesthetic tools played a part.

1. Nationalism Defined

Nationalism, national sentiment, and patriotism are sometimes used interchangeably in everyday speech, so it is important to make sure that a definition is pinned down. National sentiment is actually one of the sources of nationalism, and will hence be contrasted and discussed in greater detail in the later section on national development processes. Webster defines patriotism as “love and loyal or zealous support of one’s own country.” The first definition of nationalism, oddly enough for this study, is patriotism, but the remaining two are more revealing: “1.b) excessive, narrow, or jingoist patriotism; chauvinism. 2. The doctrine that national interest, security, etc. are more important than international considerations.”⁷³ These last two identify the type of nationalism discussed in this chapter.

A more comprehensive definition as it applies to this study is from Ernest Renan, a 19th century religious and cultural scholar:

A nation is a soul, a mental principle. Two things that are in fact one and the same constitute this principle. One of them is a store of memories, the other is a currently valid agreement, the wish to live together . . . A nation, then, is an extended community with a peculiar sense of kinship sustained by an awareness of the sacrifices that have been made in the past, and in the sacrifices the

nation is prepared to make in the future. A nation presumes a past, but the past is summed up in one tangible fact: the agreement, the desire to live life in common.⁷⁴

Renan's themes of memory and awareness of sacrifices and how these lead to kinship or the desire to live life in common seem to be the most revealing observations about nationalism taken from this study. They contrast with the less convincing earlier theory of Weimar Consistorial Counselor, Johann Gottfried

⁷³ David Bernard Guralnik, *Webster's New World dictionary of the American Language*, , 2nd college ed. (New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1986), 1692.

⁷⁴ Ernest Renan, quoted in Hagen Schulze, *States, Nations, and Nationalism*, 97.

Herder who thought that language and culture were primary for national identity.⁷⁵

Another interesting parallel definition of nationalism is actually more of an observation: that nationalism was the new secular religion. This is an important change in the definition of one's cultural role due to the decline of the church as a moral authority and the rise of the state in this capacity.⁷⁶ In other words, the estates of nobility, church, and citizens were giving way to democracy and losing their power to the social legitimization of the nation. This metamorphosis of culture brought problems to people as they tried to define their role in life because the estates as the basis for social legitimacy were disappearing as the princes were no longer ruling by divine right, but by the will of the people.⁷⁷ One example of how this played out was the French Peasants, who were slow to move in to the new political system due to their comfort with their identity within the estates. They were not ready to deal with an abstract government, because they had always had a king. They thought that "If there's no king, there's no government."⁷⁸

Nationalism developed as a concept and as a source of social legitimization from other social theories of the time the "isms". Liberalism, conservatism, and socialism were social structures which could also aid in giving a person a sense of worth. Liberalism is the perception of advantage in having individual personal freedoms, of assembly and the press for instance. This curbs the state's power in favor of the power of the people and hence it is the founding principle of many of the revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries. Socialism is the equality of classes and people, instead of personal freedoms promoted by

⁷⁵ Ibid., 156-7., Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: the Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914*, (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1976), 112. Weber notes that „Renan criticized the German concept of nationhood, as worked out by Herder, Fichte, and Humboldt, which contended that there were four basic elements of nationhood: language, tradition, race, and state.”

⁷⁶ Hagen Schulze, *States, Nations, and Nationalism*, 150, 152.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 150.

⁷⁸ Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, 248-256. Quote taken from page 248

liberalism. Conservatism is bringing the enlightenment to the government and preserving the organic diversity in the state inequality of equals.⁷⁹ Each of these gave people the idea of a common good to which they could contribute hence lending them personal legitimacy. This idea of common good was taken up by nationalist causes through the processes described hereafter.

2. History of Nationalism in Europe

Since this ideological birth, nationalism in Europe has been a long process that has gone through many stages in the various countries it has affected. Nationalism was the next step in developing political power after the Church power had waned. The product of nationalism in the past has been an identification of self in relation to the nation as opposed to the earlier modes of personal validity. There are two general routes by which nations were developed in Europe. First, in France and England the state developed the nation. Then in Germany and later in eastern Europe the cultural nation developed the state.⁸⁰ Despite the different paths, all Europeans began in a similar political situation in the middle ages in that the individual began as a member of one of the estates. All people were born into these one of these estates, either the aristocracy, the middle "class", or the peasantry, and could rarely change the estate they were in.⁸¹ The people of the different estates had separate legal rights and duties and one was expected to fulfill the role that one had been born into. The history of nationalism is steeped in the history of how the estates gradually faded, social classes arose, and subjects became citizens.

To begin with, France developed a nation from the state. The elites perceived the desirability of making Frenchmen out of peasants. There had been great regional diversity in France during the age of absolutism. The people did

⁷⁹ Definitions of the "isms" are from Hagen Schulze, *States, Nations, and Nationalism*, 152-3.

⁸⁰ Hagen Schulze, *States, Nations, and Nationalism*, 114-136.

⁸¹ This classification of estates is from *ibid.*, 6. Other classifications of estates formed from the secular and ecclesiastical aristocracy and the yeomanry, and varied over time as can be seen in Schulze 20-26, and 60-62. The basic classification of aristocracy, peasantry, and those in the middle held fast, though, throughout the history of the estates.

not use the same currency, the same units of measure, indeed the same language in some cases. The economist Adolphe Balanqui noted: "Two different peoples living on the same land a life so different that they seem foreign to each other, though united by the bonds of the most imperious centralization that ever existed."⁸² This diversity became a source of contention after the Revolution and France eventually brought all of its inhabitants together into the nation.⁸³

The British began a serious pursuit of nationalism in 1803 in response to a threat of invasion by the French. The elites were forced to call upon Britons as a whole, and hence nationalized the Welsh, English, Irish, and Scots into British citizens.⁸⁴ In contrast to the French, who eradicated the monarchy in favor of the people, the British elite maintained their class structure and led the way to other constitutional monarchies in Europe.⁸⁵ There was still very little meritocratic advancement in British politics, and though basic liberal rights were advanced and continued to rise in Great Britain, the elites maintained their separation and the monarchy maintained the crown.⁸⁶

German nationalism slowly and sporadically began through the middle and end of the 19th century. Though it had some foundations of national sentiment going back to the rediscovery of Tacitus's *Germania* of 1455, the nation did not coalesce until the communications of the industrial revolution brought the ideas of nationalism to the people.⁸⁷ Finally, the German nation we know today came about in the 20th century. "World War I transformed German nationalism by giving it emotional depth and tying it to social reform and political

⁸² Adolphe Blanqui, "Tableau des populations rurales en France en 1850," *Journal des Économistes* 28 (1851) and 30 (1851) cited in Eugen Joseph Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, 9.

⁸³ Ibid. See especially p. 9.

⁸⁴ Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 317-319.

⁸⁵ Other nations that followed the British template were Scandinavia and the Netherlands, Hagen Schulze, *States, Nations, and Nationalism*, 204.

⁸⁶ Linda Colley, *Britons*, 192-193.

⁸⁷ Hagen Schulze, *States, Nations, and Nationalism*, 127-8, 156.

entitlement.”⁸⁸ After the counterrevolution in November 1918, the people were mobilized as never before. They were organized into influential interest groups and their voice would be heard. The eventual rise of the Nazis was a consequence of these interest groups and the power they held, driving the nationalism of Germany from below. So what the Nazis created was a new role for people allowing the nationalism from below to be accepted from above, as described by Peter Fritzsche, a professor of History at the University of Illinois:

In the years 1933-1945 Germans lived in two worlds. In the midst of the familiar universe of stable links to family, region and social milieu, the Nazis constructed a “second world” out of “a network of organizations” in which “the traditional criteria of social worth and social placement had no validity.”⁸⁹

Eastern Europe, like Germany, defined their nation culturally. Though they were ruled by emperors until 1918, the roots of national sentiment were beginning in eastern Europe through the 18th century, based on the perception of common language and a common culture.⁹⁰ Hagen Schulze, a professor of modern German and European History, states in his book *States, Nations, and Nationalism*:

Identification of the individual with the nation simplified complex social and international relationships and clarified the issue of loyalty – especially in many Central European countries, where governments had frequently changed between the first partition of Poland in 1772 and the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and where today’s ruler might be tomorrow’s adversary.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Peter Fritzsche, *Germans into Nazis*, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), 28.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 228. Quotes are from Jens Abler, “Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung,” *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 41 (June 1989) p. 348, elaborates on this point, which was first raised in David Schoenbaum, *Hitler’s Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany, 1933-1939* (New York, 1966), pp.283-288

⁹⁰ Greater description of the cultural division, mixing, and turbulence in Eastern Europe at this time can be found in Hagen Schulze, *States, Nations, and Nationalism*, 157.

⁹¹ Ibid., 158.

The nations finally arose after national states were created under the Treaty of Versailles and Wilsonian “self determination,” though they were not very homogenous after their rule under the various Empires.⁹²

The processes of how these changes came to be for individual people in Europe are what is elucidated through the remainder of this chapter. The general process by which a nation develops nationalism is to bring the people to identify with the nation instead of some other entity, as we have seen earlier. There are several processes which will hence be examined, all of which used symbolism to some degree. Part of this symbolism was the use of architecture, a tangible form of art that all could identify with.

3. National Sentiment

Getting its history wrong is part of being a nation.⁹³

The role of national sentiment is at the core of nationalism. In the geographical areas discussed here nationalism developed as a product of looking to the past and this is what is referred to as national sentiment in this thesis. The sentiment is romantic as well as sentimental, as emphasized by Jean Jacques Rousseau, a philosopher who was a significant contributor to the political debate during the development of nationalism. He accentuated the romantic in the development of the state during the enlightenment, always looking to the past for the answers to national unity.⁹⁴ Of course these romantic notions of the past inevitably used the symbols and architecture of the past as objectifications of their philosophy.

A common development in the rise of sentiment is the imaginings of national roots. This phenomenon occurred in the context of eastern Europe in that that area was seen as being contrived by the scholars of western Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries.⁹⁵ Nobles wrote about their trips through

⁹² Ibid., 280-284.

⁹³ Linda Colley, *Britons*, 20.

⁹⁴ Hagen Schulze, *States, Nations, and Nationalism*, 83-85.

⁹⁵ Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: the Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*, (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1994), 419.

eastern Europe and much of the visions of how it was there came from these first hand accounts.⁹⁶ Other authors merely imagined eastern Europe from afar, without actually visiting all of the places they discussed, but were nonetheless quite influential on how it was perceived from the west. Rudolph Erich Raspe went even further and imagined a fantastic area to the east with only allegorical reference to reality.⁹⁷ All of these authors invented something to a lesser or greater degree, and this invention of the “Other” in eastern Europe contributed to the later and sometimes simultaneous nationalization of the “We” in western Europe. Of course, while inventing the Other in eastern Europe they were inevitably giving the eastern Europeans cultural fuel to fire their own national pride. There are many further examples of how the remainder of Europe used their own national history to produce sentiment, which will be illuminated in the following sections of the chapter.

To begin with, Schultze echoes the observation of invention suggesting that while the people go to seek their roots, they occasionally even make up their roots as Germany expounded on their national root through the rediscovered text of *Germania*.⁹⁸ In a similar manipulation of national culture, traditional ceremonies in France were converted into national character.⁹⁹ All of this contrivance of national character through the use of the past is, at times, a manipulation. Whether intended or not, nationalist movements mold the past to meet their present needs. The vehicles that are used to develop this sentiment are the use of *Us* and *Them*, The development of a “cult of the soldier,” and the use of aesthetics.¹⁰⁰ Each of these methods is actually more aesthetic than pragmatic, though, and hence the connection to architecture. These aesthetic

⁹⁶ Note the trips of William Coxe, Lady Mary, Cassanova, William Richardson, and Count Louis-Philippe de Ségur in *ibid.*, 50-88.

⁹⁷ Note Voltaire, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Jean-Paul Marat, and the musings of Mozart in *ibid.*, 89-143. See also the chapter devoted to Voltaire pp.195-234.

⁹⁸ Hagen Schulze, *States, Nations, and Nationalism*, 127-130.

⁹⁹ Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, 474.

¹⁰⁰ The cult of the soldier is described throughout George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*.

means of arguing for a polity, or selling it, can be translated in to architecture or indicate how the aesthetics of architecture can affect the mind of a nation.

a. Use of Us and Them

There are few more effective ways of bonding together a highly disparate people than by encouraging it to unite against its own and other outsiders. . . . It gave the majority of men and women a sense of their place in history and a sense of worth. It allowed them to feel pride in such advantages as they genuinely did enjoy, and helped them to endure when hardship threatened. It gave them identity.¹⁰¹

Bringing the people together under one nation also involves defining who *We* are and this leads to defining who *the Other* is. The slippery slope that results is how much we love ourselves can be translated into how much we hate the Other that we have defined ourselves in contrast to. But all cases of the development of nationalism in Europe used some sort of definition of the other, whether it was the French use of the heathens within France as well as to the east, the British use of the French Catholics to the South, or the German and East European use of the Other within.

Western Europe as a whole defined themselves in terms of their difference from eastern Europe. Eastern Europe was considered to be Oriental or Hellenistic, barbaric in comparison to the west. Hence, as seen earlier, the culture of the west defined itself in contrast to the barbarity of the East.¹⁰²

France developed their nationalism despite the Otherness of France itself. During their time of assimilation of the various compartments of France in the late 19th century, the compartments themselves felt that they were being colonized by France. For instance, there was some resistance put up in Brittany to the development of French culture. They spoke their own language and had their own customs and to them the Other was the Frenchman as they were the other to France. The job of France, then, was to turn the tables and

¹⁰¹ Linda Colley, *Britons*, 53.

¹⁰² Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, 419. See especially 7-16 in the introduction.

make France into the We and Brittany into the Other.¹⁰³ They were eventually successful in this throughout France, through promotion of France through French heritage and creating the new Us in the provinces.

England began their national quest in a similar fashion; the Other was Scotland, Ireland, and Wales. For instance, Scots, and especially the highland Scots, are seen by British as better soldiers and this lent to apprehension at accepting them in to politics. But the wars against the Colonies changed the Other and allowed Great Britain to see itself as a whole. This development led to intermarriage between the Celtic and English elites and brought homogeny to the island.¹⁰⁴

A further homogenizing agent was the fact that the entire British island was anti-French, and additionally anti Catholic. This of course led to difficulties in accepting the Irish that we still see the remnants of today. These two main themes, religious and national Otherness, were seen throughout the nationalization of Great Britain.¹⁰⁵ It is also interesting to note that after the French were defeated, the Other went away, and there was great turmoil in Great Britain over the definition of Britishness. Hence the development of the fox hunts noted earlier.¹⁰⁶

During the interwar year, the eastern Europeans were experimenting with nationalism, the society of Europe was turning toward isolationist strategies, and this isolationism increased the poverty in the east and the feeling of eastern Europe that they were being left out to dry by other nations. East Europe was economically tied to exports so they lost a great deal during the

¹⁰³ Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, 486-493.

¹⁰⁴ For a discussion of the integration of Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, see Linda Colley, *Britons*, 155-164.. For discussion of the Scottish nationality as viewed by the English, see *ibid.*, 119-126.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 18, 25, 367-8.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 321-324.



Figure 3. Bismarck Tower at Heidelberg. From George Mosse, *The Nationalism of the Masses*, Plate 1.

“beggar thy neighbor” years of the 1930s.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, there was a lack of social mobility inherent in the eastern European societies in the post-WWI years, and this kept national peasantry from rising in to the ranks of the middle class. The gaps in society in eastern Europe were filled by immigrants, Jews, and other “non indigenous people,” which lent to some of the hatred of the Other in these societies.¹⁰⁸ In other words, liberalism and democracy failed and was replaced by race and class in the 1920s.

Of course, there is no better example of the use of Us and Them than in the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union both used the aesthetic of the evil power on the other side of the fence to bring their people under a common cause and motivate them to defense. This perception drove policies and attitudes for decades.

¹⁰⁷ Ivan Berend, *Decades of Crisis*, 15-16.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 33-39.

b. Nationalism Creates a “Cult of the Soldier”

Another tool used to create national sentiment was the fallen soldier himself. This myth was created and perpetuated through the use of aesthetics, and monuments were used to perpetuate the idea continuously between the wars.¹⁰⁹ They would show how the nation had survived by reflecting on the past before the wars, like the Celtic references of the Bismarck towers, (see Figure 3) and by commemorating the war dead of WWI contradicting the war guilt placed upon them by the Treaty of Versailles.¹¹⁰ Simultaneously, they contributed to the commemoration and worship of the fallen. In this way, war monuments not only commemorated the battles and the fallen but “provided an example for other generations to follow.”¹¹¹ The people should strive to be like their fallen comrades who had given their lives to the cause of the nation in the past. This is how nationalists mobilized the people using the monuments.

The case of these monuments to fallen soldiers is also an interesting example of how form superseded function in nationalist architecture, just as it does in church architecture. In the early 20th century, the newly formed National Festival Society needed to select the best place to hold its festivals. A monument (the Niederwalddenkmal) was chosen, not for rational or practical reasons, but because it was already established in the national liturgy. The monument had no nearby areas to conduct the desired sporting activities and festivals as other monuments had, but it was chosen anyway.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, 264.

¹¹⁰ The Bismarck towers were spread throughout Germany as commemoratives to Chancellor Bismarck. They used Celtic style to encourage the viewer to reflect on German history.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 35.

¹¹² George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, 94-95.



Figure 4. “The Fallen Comrade” German Postcard, WWI. From George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, 130.

Another way the myth was perpetuated through symbols was through cemeteries. Tangible symbols of death were both moved away from the masses and their symbolism was changed. Cemeteries were moved out of the center of towns and hence away from the masses, though this was certainly not only for symbolic reasons of nationalism, but for sanitary reasons as well. The churchyards were becoming overcrowded and the smell was beginning to be associated with illness.¹¹³

The change of symbolism was that cemeteries became less focused on the dead and death, and more focused on life and the perpetuation of the myth of the fallen soldier. Aesthetics contributed by creating less tangible attachments to individual deaths, and more to the greater glory of the myth. For instance, the standard cemeteries of lines of headstones were inculcated with nature to demonstrate how the dead were going back to the roots of the land, which incidentally was a part of the nation. “The image of the Grim Reaper was replaced by the image of death as eternal sleep. This change in the perception of death transformed the Christian cemetery into a peaceful wooded landscape

¹¹³ George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, 38-39.

of groves and meadows.”¹¹⁴(See Figure 4) Furthermore, the heroism in dying for ones country was emphasized as mentioned earlier.

The cult of the fallen was even perpetuated by religious ritual in some countries, showing the close ties between the symbols of faith and the symbols of nationalism. “Even during the anti-Christian phase of the French Revolution, and the German Wars of Liberation as well, volunteers were often blessed in the church before going to join their regiments.”¹¹⁵ Thus, in Europe religious symbolism cooperated with the nationalist cause in creating the myth of the soldier. The nationalists used the Christian past like this when they could, but essentially had secularized their movement by the end of World War One.¹¹⁶

c. Use of the Aesthetics of Battle and the Military

Another source of national sentiment through this cult is the manipulation of the image of battles and the military. Related to aesthetics, this manipulation changes how the soldier and war itself are viewed. This usage of the military is most easily seen in the case of Nazi Germany, but glimpses can also be seen in the remainder of Europe as they were nationalizing.

To begin with, by the 1890s there was a change in France from an attitude of “their army” to one of “our army.”¹¹⁷ As the people were nationalized and the idea of the citizen soldier came to fruition the military was one way that Frenchmen identified with being French. Of course one of the reasons for this new ownership of the military was the fact that the barracks were also used as a source of education in France. It was one of the places where the peasantry could learn to read and understand the common tongue of French, which brought France together as a nation in the late 19th century. In this way, people of the schools and the army were agents of national change in France.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 39.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 25.

¹¹⁶ George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, 89.

¹¹⁷ Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, 298.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 298, ix-xiii.

There was a similar trend in Britain. Colley speaks at length about the role of the military in nationalizing Britain: "In Great Britain, as in other major European powers, it was training in arms under the auspices of the state that was the most common collective working-class experience in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries."¹¹⁹ They educated their population, like the French, through the military which had the additional advantage of bringing the people together in a bond through their mutual service.

There were also less pragmatic ways that the state used the military to build the nation in Britain. In the cultural realm, "War played a vital role in the invention of a British nation after 1707," when Scotland, England, and Wales were linked politically.¹²⁰ "More than anything else . . . it is the experience of recurrent wars that brought these diverse peoples together."¹²¹ So in the course of the wars of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the people had found a common bond and this common bond was spread through the military,

Of course the background of battle had always been present in British history. Through the middle ages and the beginnings of nationalism, the Britons were a people who are willing to fight for their country, and have largely defined themselves through fighting. This trend continues for the Britons to this day, and therefore contributes heavily to the development of their national sentiment.¹²²

This sentiment for battle translated into a cult of manliness in the British, which was perpetuated even in times of peace. During times of relative peace in the middle and late 19th century, British manliness was demonstrated in the fox hunt. This activity practiced by nobles and potential officers was seen as a virtue that will translate in to combat. For instance, the horsemanship involved

¹¹⁹ Linda Colley, *Britons*, 312.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 367. see also the affects of the battle of Waterloo in 1815 in *ibid.*, 322.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 366.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 9.

was considered to be indicative of the ability to participate in a cavalry charge, and sometimes the fox was even equated to the Frenchman.¹²³

In Germany the trend of warfare and manliness translating to nationalism went to an even greater degree as “war mongering encouraged nation building.” The Prussian heritage of manliness through battle was present throughout their earlier history and took hold as their cultural heritage in the early 20th century. At that time, World War I took a place in German national history as a transitional time for their nationalism as they developed from a nation of the state to a cultural nation.¹²⁴ Ties to the crown declined as the feeling of being a nation of Germans arose. There was a cult of the soldier in Germany.¹²⁵

As a corollary to the direct military role, there were affects of the war for civilians on the home front that contributed to nationalism. For instance, the potato and bread lines during the war promoted national unity as the shared hardship of the trenches was transmuting the national sentiment of the soldier.¹²⁶ Shared hardship, then, certainly brings people together and this was one of the tools that the people striving for nationalism used to create sentiment in the populace.

Finally, after the Second World War, the Soviets used the aesthetics of their soldiers to create national monuments commemorating their battles of the war. As in the Nazi case, these monuments served as gathering places for national festivals, and were built all around the country, like the Bismarck Towers of Germany the century before.¹²⁷

d. Use of Aesthetics

¹²³ Ibid., 170-172. See especially the comments of Lord Seaton, a veteran of Waterloo on page 172.

¹²⁴ Peter Fritzsche, *Germans into Nazis*, 28. In other words, the nation that was once a conglomeration of the people living in the state of Germany learned their traditions and culture and began to define themselves in terms of this culture in lieu of in terms of the geographic boundaries they lived in.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 104.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 75.

¹²⁷ Anders Åman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era*, 38. Also see footnote 70 in reference to Soviet nationalism.

The most interesting way in which nationalism manifested national sentiment was through the use of all kinds of aesthetics including art, architecture, and maps. The case of eastern Europe is a good general case in the study of aesthetics in nationalism. There was a desire during the first years of the twentieth century in this area, during their burgeoning nationalism, to express a feeling of political injustice and many times this manifested itself in art. Ivan Berend, a professor of History at the University of California and prolific author on eastern Europe, discusses how they were seeking liberalization from their hegemonic regimes.

Sociopolitical rebellion . . . was often more possible in the arts than in politics in the nondemocratic, oppressive and even despotic political regimes of Central and Eastern Europe. Rebellious artistic groups sought to play a direct political role in mobilizing people and destroying old values that they considered false and hypocritical.¹²⁸

In other words, after the Central and Eastern German nations were freed from the rule of empires, during the 1930s, there was somewhat of a crisis in art that illustrates this desire for change.

In addition to the artists themselves, the new dictators, and especially Hitler and Stalin, were intent upon changing art to meet their political ends. They enforced strict edicts on what was considered good art and oppressed those who expressed themselves differently. The new art would be classicism and heroic monumentalism as directed by the central powers.¹²⁹ This strict enforcement of artistic style reflected the politics of the time. In an interesting stylistic twist, Stalin later tried to homogenize his culture by creating a new (not classic) style of Socialist Realism.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Ivan Berend, *Decades of Crisis*, 85.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 358-395.

¹³⁰ Anders Åman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era*,



Figure 5. The engraving *Calais Gate* by William Hogarth. From Linda Colley, *Britons*, 34.

The British host an example of the use of fine art to generate national sentiment, in this case as a satirical gouge against the perennial enemies, the French. In the engraving *Calais Gate* by William Hogarth (See Figure 5) the artist illustrated the “French disadvantages: lacking real liberty, their wealth was bound to be superficial and grossly ill distributed, their religion entangled forever in superstition.”¹³¹ The viewer saw ugly people including some confused nuns who have found the image of Christ in a fish, a greedy monk, and skinny and effeminate soldiers.¹³²

¹³¹ Linda Colley, *Britons*, 34.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 33.




Figure 6. British Cavalry Officers. From Linda Colley, *Britons*, 136.

The case of the multiple British monarchs from 1625 to 1727 is an example of how people attempted to use architecture to further the nation. During this time, Britain had a total of seven monarchs, five of whom reigned for less than 13 years. In their desire to assert themselves and their country politically, they each tried to create a palace in their own style. This multiplicity of styles resulted in a confusion of designs for the architecture of Britain. As Linda Colley, a Yale professor of History and author on British history, said, “The British monarchy’s failure to associate itself with one particular set of splendid buildings had practical as well as symbolic repercussions.”¹³³ The repercussions were that the lack of splendor in architectural style was accompanied by a lack of splendor in the royal courts. The large royal families simply did not have enough space to live separate from one another, and the relatively small palaces did not have enough room for an opulent court.¹³⁴ Hence, no opulent buildings *and* no

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 198-199.

¹³⁴ British palaces were quite small relative to the gargantuan French Versailles.

opulent court, leading to a less formidable appearance to the other nations of the world.

A further aesthetic transformation in Britain was seen in the military. The uniforms of the officers and men were transformed between 1780 and 1815 “from peacock male to somber man of action.”¹³⁵(See Figure 6) They initiated an aesthetic transformation that was followed by the remainder of Europe. They got rid of the powdered wigs, padded shoulders and high-heeled boots for more practical wear. The aesthetic was giving way to the practical and changing the fashion itself as the people who wore it changed in attitude.¹³⁶ As the people nationalized and pressed for the rights of the individual in the nation, the uniforms of the military reflected a trend away from the pomp of court to the necessity of the soldier.

Several authors note how maps are used to nationalize peoples.¹³⁷ Again, in the context of western Europeans identifying the east as the Other in order to define themselves, they make maps and more importantly they color them. The coloring of the maps signifies to what culture each country belongs. To wit, they signify where the boundary is between eastern and western Europe.¹³⁸ They use strategic coloring on a piece of paper to show where “they” are and that they are a definable people in a definable place. Of course the line is more blurred than a map maker would like. Eastern Europeans do not fit into the colorings that the maps simplify pictorially for the western Europeans, and this shows how symbolism was more important than geographic accuracy.

Additionally, the French used maps to define themselves. The role of the schools in developing Frenchmen out of peasants was, among other things, to teach them about what France was. To do this, maps were distributed

¹³⁵ Ibid., 187.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 186-188.

¹³⁷ See Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, 144-194., Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, 334.

¹³⁸ Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, 144-194.

throughout France and “they inculcated all with the image of the national hexagon.”¹³⁹

This indicates another change that brought aesthetics to the masses. Industrialization brought photography and the printing press and allowed the mass production of nationalist propaganda. Mass media in England for instance, like the French production of educational maps, brought nationalist propaganda to the people in their developmental years of the early 19th century.¹⁴⁰

It is argued by some that the “transformation of the public spirit was facilitated by rebellious, transforming art.”¹⁴¹ However, Fritzsche offers a word of warning about how far this argument can be taken. “Public spectacles such as May Day and the Nuremburg Rallies did not create Nazis out of Germans. Social identities cannot be fashioned on a potter’s wheel.”¹⁴² Aesthetics have played an important part in the history of nationalism, then, but as stated in the beginning of this chapter they are only one of innumerable causes.

e. German Nationalist Style

Due to their references to history in seeking national sentiment, the style of nationalism became to some degree historical.¹⁴³ “Madame de Staël in *On Germany* complained that as a city Berlin was altogether too new, as new as the excessive military of Prussia. There was ‘too little past’ in Berlin, she complained, nothing Gothic! ‘One sees no evidence of former times.’”¹⁴⁴ So it was seen by the nationalists, with not enough attention to history that would unite

¹³⁹ Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, 334.

¹⁴⁰ Linda Colley, *Britons*, 180.

¹⁴¹ Ivan Berend, *Decades of Crisis*, 86-87.

¹⁴² Peter Fritzsche, *Germans into Nazis*, 226. The author is a professor of history at the University of Illinois.

¹⁴³ These ranges of historic degrees include the brash historicism of Hitler’s designs for the future Germany to the amalgamation of modernism and historicism in Russia that was noted earlier.

¹⁴⁴ Amos Elon, *The pity of it all*, 13. Mme de Staël quote from Madame de Staël, O. W. Wight, and F. Max Müller, *Germany* (Boston, New York,: Houghton, Mifflin, 1887).



Figure 7. Hitler examining an architectural model of Linz. From Frederic Spotts, *Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics*.¹⁴⁵

the people, while versing that rhetorically in a quest for the new. The new art would look back to the past.

Hitler, for instance, pursued a historic style for architecture, and remarked that humanity was never so close to antiquity in its appearance and sensibilities than today.¹⁴⁶ His quest for a national style would drive him to distraction as he spent many hours before and even during the war contemplating new designs for Berlin, Munich, and Linz.¹⁴⁷ Though to many architects of the time, Germany was the holder of the best in modern design, the Bauhaus, Hitler paid little attention to modern aesthetics, even though many

¹⁴⁵ Frederic Spotts, *Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics* (Woodstock: Overlook Press, 2003).

¹⁴⁶ Quoted in Armand Dehlinger, *Architektur der Superlative* (Unpublished MS, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich), 33 cited in George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, 184.

¹⁴⁷ Frederic Spotts, *Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics*, 351-385.

buildings in the Reich were built in the style.¹⁴⁸ Neo-classicism would be the style of nationalism.

All architecture was linked to the past, even new architecture, and this is most starkly exemplified in the new monuments of nationalism. The intent of the monuments for the nationalists was threefold. They would act as a gathering space to promote nationalism, visually contribute to the national liturgy, and perpetuate the cult of the fallen soldier, making him into a figure to be emulated. Ernst Moritz Arndt and Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, architects in the Third Reich, both advocated building romantic national monuments.¹⁴⁹ They should reflect on Germany's great history, whether they directly imitate the style or merely allude to it. This allusion is demonstrated by many of the architects of the time who take cues from history, and creating a new style with the roots of one or more older ones.

One example of the amalgamation of multiple historic styles is the architecture of Wilhelm Kreis, the builder of 500 of the nationalist "Bismarck Towers," monuments scattered throughout the German landscape "in praise of the chancellor who had brought about German unity." Kreis advocated a German national style that was not too classical. They must establish their own style, he thought, and he did this by combining the classical and the Saxon traditions.¹⁵⁰ The resulting towers were reminiscent of the Saxon piles of stone that they used as burial mounds, being massive, simple and aesthetically heavy.

Another example of the combination of historic styles is the , a nationalist monument built at the turn of the century to commemorate the one hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig, which is a combination of the classical and an ancient pyramid. It uses monumental form to make an impression on the visitor, like the Bismarck towers, but without any representation of a

¹⁴⁸ George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, 186.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 33-34.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 36-37.

specific individual.¹⁵¹ The use of statues of individual historic figures had been commonplace up to this point, but the nationalist drive for each German being essentially united to all others in “germanness” lent to the new style.

The new style of the architecture of nationalism was most starkly expressed in the new monuments, using classical styles to reflect back on what it was to be German. This historical reference through massive architecture provided not only a visual symbol of the constructive power of the Reich, but a place for national worship of the myth of the fallen soldier. (See Figure 8)

An interesting postscript to this discussion is a demonstration of how style can be interpreted by the viewer and meaning can be reassigned. The Völkerschlachtdenkmal, was eventually adopted as a symbol of the DDR, of the fact that Russians and Germans had fought side-by-side during the revolution.¹⁵² This is a demonstration of how some aesthetic principles can have bad results. The removal of individual representation was bad for the longevity of the nationalist reading of this monument. “Monuments survive all times and the fury of all enemies, but they will be lifeless unless the history of the nation remains alive within the soul of the people.”¹⁵³

4. Conclusion - Nationalism and Symbolism

So nationalism is a fine example of how aesthetics can be used to unite a mass of people; as the church had done it, so would the nationalists. The use of symbols was a part of how they intended to unite the people. As mentioned before, “Symbols were visible, concrete objectifications of the myths in which the people could participate.”¹⁵⁴ They participated not only through the festivals mentioned earlier, but in everyday life through the ‘participation’ of walking through streets lined with nationalist banners or working in examples of the national architecture. “Politics and life must penetrate each other, and this

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 65.

¹⁵² Ibid., 66-67.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 33.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 7.




Figure 8. Völkerschlachtdenkmal at Leipzig. From George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, Plate 11.

means that all forms of life become politicized. Literature, art, architecture, and even our environment are seen as symbolic of political attitudes.”¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 215.

Symbolism was the only way to express the universe of myths that were being created by the nationalist cause, and the symbolism “must incorporate the aesthetic and the artistic . . .” and furthermore, “symbols, the objectification of popular myths, gave people their identity.”¹⁵⁶ So it is shown that nationalism as the new religion needed symbols to solidify its cause. As Mosse said,

. . . the aesthetics of politics was the force which linked myths, symbols, and the feelings of the masses. . . . A concept of beauty objectified the dream world of happiness and order while it enabled men to contact those supposedly immutable forces which stand outside the flow of daily life.¹⁵⁷

D. ARCHITECTURE AND NATIONAL SENTIMENT IN EUROPE

Throughout history the powerful have tried to use aesthetic tools to manipulate the people to their political ends. Religious power is certainly no exception to this rule, as shown here. They have used the methods described above to further their political ends to some success and each generation seems to have done well in building on the lessons of the past. The connection between aesthetics and politics observed through this history is through its connection to national sentiment and the power of the population that could be manipulated with this tool.

This desire for nationalization was caused by a perceived benefit to all of the European population. The elites saw the benefit of bringing the people under a common cause of the new religion of nationalism. The people then had a moral background to be mobilized economically or militarily in support of the nation. The common man saw the benefit of the gain of rights. If everyone was now a Frenchman, for instance, then the elites would have a harder time reaping all the gains of the peasantry. Furthermore, the social mobility provided by a meritocratic system meant that one's children had far greater opportunity as well. Even in the less meritocratic case of Great Britain, this is the case. Being citizens and not subjects was a profound transition, and meant that Nation

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 7.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 20.

became more powerful than class.¹⁵⁸ The education of the people, as exemplified in France earlier was an additional benefit for the masses as well as the elites. The only people that lost out seem to be the aristocracies, who no longer have much of a say in politics.

We have seen the historical advance of power and how it led to nationalism and a desire for an increase in national sentiment. In the era of Christian power in Europe, churches were the symbol of power, as was illustrated by the financing of St. Peter's basilica in Rome. The Church used this architecture and symbols of the history of the Church to bring the people of Europe together under one religion. The challenges to these symbols illustrate the importance that they had on their supporters and opponents both. The Protestants of the Reformation both destroyed and restored church artifacts, and the Ottomans reestablished a church as a mosque. Finally, in later years, the nationalists adopted the same methods of destruction and rebuilding symbols to advance their new secular religion. It is important to recognize how these aesthetic methods played a role in advancing power through history, as the same methods are used by secular power. Architecture is the art that emphasized how important aesthetics were to the advancement of ideas, because in architecture there was always a battle between whether the functionality or aesthetics of a building were primary. In the architecture of the ideologies, as we have seen, function was subordinate to form demonstrating the importance of aesthetics to political thought. In fact, in the case of religious and political architecture the function is aesthetic and hence form and function are one.

The development of nationalism called for a new level of activation of the population, as opposed to the direct control that was seen before. The question of how people are nationalized has been addressed here from several angles: that of the use of "We" and the "Other," the "cult of the soldier," and a deep look at the role of aesthetics in developing national sentiment. These processes are just part of what may cause a person to become a nationalist but they are

¹⁵⁸ Linda Colley, *Britons*, 312-313.

universal in the case of nationalism in Europe. The identification of the Other is especially important in looking at future cases of nationalism because if it is taken too far, it can result in racial hatred and be detrimental to society. Only in Germany did it become genocidal, but this case illustrates how careful we must be.¹⁵⁹

In the pursuit of the question, how do architecture and the rhetoric of politics relate, we conclude from the historical examination that the link is through a desire to increase national sentiment. As the people gain power over the powerful through liberalization, the powerful desire to control that power. They have used aesthetics and the aesthetics of architecture to pursue that goal. Architecture is a very public and permanent art, as we have seen, though the rhetoric that it generates may or may not support the ideas it was created to embody.¹⁶⁰ The powerful, eventually the government, use these symbols to increase national sentiment then, in pursuit of their own ends.

¹⁵⁹ Peter Fritzsche, *Germans into Nazis*, 269.

¹⁶⁰ Notice how the Ottoman Turks used the symbols of Hagia Sophia to their own ends. Also, the change of rhetoric about the Völkerschlachtdenkmal in the communist era shows how rhetoric can be changed.

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IV. ARCHITECTURE AND POLITICS IN BERLIN AND PRAGUE: POST 1989

We shape our buildings and afterwards our buildings shape us
Winston Churchill.¹⁶¹

The architecture of the twentieth century has gone through dramatic change to mirror the changes of polity. Stalin embarked upon a change of architecture in Russia while modern theorists in Germany were developing a new “International” style for the free world. Hitler planned massive changes to the architecture of Germany to reflect his great Reich and diverted resources from the war to accomplish this.¹⁶² In his own words, while speaking over a model of a plan for the intended cultural capitol of Linz, “The funds which I shall devote to these will vastly exceed the expenditures which we found necessary for the conduct of this war.”¹⁶³

In the inter-war period, the Soviets had tried to enforce their architectural style upon the newly subjugated Central European states, or “people’s democracies.” This was viewed by most of the Central European states as an imposition on their national sovereignty, but they were not given an option in most cases as the Soviets wanted to use their aesthetic methods to spread communism as described in Chapter III.¹⁶⁴ This architecture was everywhere, and was most prevalent in the new housing projects of the post-Stalinist era, but extended to most projects in varying degrees.

¹⁶¹ Winston Churchill in debate on rebuilding the House of Commons, 1943, quoted in Deyan Sudjic with Helen Jones, *Architecture and Democracy*, 8.

¹⁶² The various programs of Nazi Germany to implement architectural change in part through slave labor is described in Paul B. Jaskot, *The Architecture of Oppression*, and Frederic Spotts, *Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics*.

¹⁶³ Hitler quoted in Frederic Spotts, *Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics*, xii.

¹⁶⁴ The threat to national sovereignty is explained in Anders Åman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era*, 72-73. *The expansion of the architecture throughout the people’s democracies is described in Chapter IV of the same book.*

The Democratic societies meanwhile embraced modernism, and artistic freedom. With this in mind, the question here is what will the new leaders of Eastern and Central Europe do with their architecture after the great political change of 1989? How will the government and the elites building their architecture express their own political views and the views of the new society through the built form? We will examine these questions through the case studies of Berlin and Prague in the post-communist era.

A. BERLIN

The example of eastern Berlin is most apropos for several reasons. First, they are simply constructing a great deal of buildings. Eastern Berlin has been building a staggering amount of private and public buildings through the past decade which makes it a target rich environment for architectural study.¹⁶⁵ The reason for this is partially due to the money coming from her big (rich) brother to the West, and indeed some of the most prominent structures are in the government sector due to the relocation of the Federal government from Bonn to Berlin. Another part of the reason for the architectural change in Berlin is due to the nature of architecture as an art. Urban architecture is unique in that it is the only art that requires the patron to destroy a former piece of art in order to create a new one. Berlin, then, is unique in that when the wall came down, room was freed to build.

Another reason that eastern Germany is a good case for study is the large amount of debate on her architecture. There is a vast and varied literature since 1989 of the many facets of the argument about what should be built in the new Germany. Again, much of this falls in to the realm of the moving Federal government.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ Many architectural and other periodicals discuss the plethora of work that has been completed in Berlin since 1989, some of which are noted in the bibliography here. A brief survey of most of the important new works may be found in Martin Kieren, *New Architecture Berlin 1990-2000* (Berlin: Jovis, 1998).

¹⁶⁶ The literature ranges from architectural magazines to the political periodicals and books dedicated to the subject. See the bibliography of this thesis for further works, but most influential to this work have been the books of George Mosse and a survey of Berlin by Michael Wise.

A final reason for Germany's usefulness as a case is her Nazi past. Due to the horrors of World War Two committed by German citizens, there is a tentative nature about German politics, and this nature is reflected in their architecture.¹⁶⁷ This is doubly the case when observing the debate around and construction of her public architecture in Berlin. In this way the architecture of Berlin has been affected by the history of the nation as it is perceived ideologically by her citizens. This actually perpetuated itself in the Soviet era by allowing greater transformation of architecture in her center in comparison to Prague. There are many examples of how Socialist Realism infiltrated the center of East Berlin.¹⁶⁸

The German case, in sum, is an accelerated study of the results of the political change that took place in the East in 1989. This acceleration is due to her greater financial backing as well as her political background and her intense debate over national architecture. Furthermore, the case lends itself to the study of public architecture, as opposed to private, which will be addressed in relation to Prague. The dynamics of private individuals and how their national sentiment combines with personal artistic sensibilities contributes a whole new range of variables to the discussion of architecture and politics. These non-public cases will not be considered here.

The cases taken in this study will be from the national architecture of Berlin since the fall of the Wall in 1989. Since that remarkable day, Berlin has redesigned herself aesthetically as well as politically, and though she has not been able to rid herself of the scar of communist rule, she has made some remarkable progress toward a freer architecture to match her freedom in politics. Some examples of the redesign of the constructed environment are the redesign of the Reichstag, the center of government for the country, the urban design of

¹⁶⁷ This theme is noted in Michael Wise, "Bonn: Capital of Self-Effacement" in *Capital Dilemma*, as well as Anders Åman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era*, 99-102.

¹⁶⁸ Consider the Stalinallee which is a massive example of monumentality expressed through Socialist Realism, as noted in Anders Åman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era*, 119-125.

the political center of the new government, and the design of the monument to the Jewish victims of the Holocaust.

These three structural examples will be discussed in light of several topics which shall pervade each, some of which were discussed in the previous chapters. The themes of architecture and remembrance, internationalism through the aesthetic, the aesthetic and political importance of site, and finally the relationship of aesthetics to ideology will come in to play to different degrees in each example. The question of national sentiment is again a pervading issue in the architecture of Berlin as well. The concluding paragraphs will then sum up the meaning of these themes in light of Berlin's architectural changes.

1. Reichstag

The Reichstag redesign is one of the most obvious design changes in the new (and old) capitol of Germany. (Figure 9) Thus it has received a great amount of attention of critics. The debate over the structure has raged over what to do with the gutted shell of a classic piece of German Wilhelmine architecture. War damage had left architects with an interesting remnant. The façade of the building stood, though the interior and the roof were a shambles. So designers had to decide whether to rebuild the traditional structure as it was originally, or to do a complete redesign of the interior and roof in a different style.¹⁶⁹

Of course the debate was between preservationists on the one side, both artistic and theoretical, and the modernists on the other. Preservationists felt that, to one extent or another, the building should be maintained for posterity and in some cases restored to its original aesthetic. It is a standing monument to the old Germany which some Germans may want to remember.

On the other hand, other Germans do not want to recall the past. More to the point, they don't want to be perceived as recalling the past. The Nazi history was a horrible past that no one in Germany wants to relive, of course, and no one outside of Germany wants to relive either. So the modernist designers,

¹⁶⁹ Michael Wise, *Capital Dilemma*, 121-23.



Figure 9. New Reichstag, with glass dome. Photograph taken by German Oberstleutnant Ekkehard Stemmer, May 2004.

given the desire to reoccupy the old building wanted to change the building into something as different as possible from the old style. They didn't want to forget the past, but they didn't want to recall it either.¹⁷⁰

Architecture and remembrance as it generates national identity, as noted earlier is a key form in which the art plays in to politics. This is especially the case in eastern Europe and actually anywhere where a major political change has taken place. New political structures tend to change the architecture that surrounds them after the political change. Much to the chagrin of staunch art theorists, who sometimes contend that a certain aesthetic inherently represents a certain political style, art does not reflect society in that way. For instance, it may seem plausible that modern architecture is free from the constraint of the

¹⁷⁰ Michael Wise, *Capital Dilemma*, 1-20.

romantic past, and would represent a more liberal view of politics. This is not represented in society, though, as such totalitarians as Stalin and Mussolini used modern architecture to represent their causes.¹⁷¹

The debate over the design of the Reichstag culminated in an international design competition for the plan. This is another indication of how Germany was trying to remain politically meek in the design of their building. It is not unusual for parliaments to be designed by natives, and in fact the parliamentary buildings of the United States, Finland, Britain, Poland, Slovenia and Hungary were all designed by indigenous architects. Some of these were by a famous designated national architect, some by internal competition, and some by international competition where local architects won.¹⁷² Therefore it would not have been unreasonable for Germany to pursue a competition limited to its own architects. The choice was another indication of Germany's somewhat tentative nature toward showing national pride.

The design that won the competition was a modernist redesign of the interior and the lost roofline of the structure. The ideological components read in to the design were many. The new roof would have a glass dome, through which the people could walk over the ceiling of the assembly chamber. This represented how the people were superior to the parliament, by virtue of being above them. Additionally, the glass of the dome represented the transparency of democracy and indeed of the new Germany as a whole.¹⁷³ Interestingly, the communists had used the same metaphor in one of their buildings right in Berlin. The Palace of the Republic had been designed with large expanses of glass to represent eastern Germany's strides toward modern urban culture.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ As noted earlier this is the theme of Anders Åman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era*.

¹⁷² Deyan Sudjic with Helen Jones, *Architecture and Democracy* (Glasgow: Laurence King Publishing, 1999) note this in Chapters 1-3.

¹⁷³ Elanor Heartney, "Berlin: Future Perfect?" *Art in America* 88, Iss. 2, (2000), 109.

¹⁷⁴ Michael Wise, *Capital Dilemma*, 51-53.



Figure 10. Wilhelmine Reichstag as completed in 1894. From Michael Wise, *Capital Dilemma*, plate 44.

It is obvious then, that a transparent structure does not inherently represent the transparency of government. Nor does it cause the people to believe that the government is any more transparent. The symbolic nature of the glass dome of the Reichstag is, in fact, that it was not glass before, it looked more like a World War I German helmet. (Figure 10) It is the change of the architecture that people will note, and take that as a change in the attitude of those that are building it.¹⁷⁵ Those people being the politicians, not the architects.

This relationship between client and architect has long been understood. It is the nature of the architect to create something for the client which will meet both aesthetic and practical needs. The nature of architecture, then, is being the most accessible art form that the client (politicians in the case of public architecture) can create. It will be on display in the public eye more than any

¹⁷⁵ Anders Åman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era*, 248-259.




Figure 11. Memorial to Jewish Holocaust victims, by Peter Eisenman and Richard Serra. From Michael Wise, *Capital Dilemma*, plate 64.

other expression, and is relatively permanent, in that it is not easily changed. It is no wonder that politicians, more than any other client, take great care in the production of architecture. For them the balance of form and function leans heavily to that of form, in some cases to the point that form *is* function.

2. Holocaust Memorial

This case could not be any more obvious than in the design of national monuments, as seen during the rise of nationalism. The design competition for the Holocaust memorial could not have had greater symbolic significance and therefore received a due amount of political attention. The selection of the site, in the first place, was a politically and emotionally charged one. The placement would have to be central; there would be no hiding from the past. Surprisingly, while the contemplation of the memorial was still taking place, the wall came

down, and a great amount of extra land became available. In fact the site of the memorial was moved to a place both near to the Reichstag, the Brandenburg Gate and the bunker where Hitler had spent his last hours.¹⁷⁶ This kind of symbolism was just what Berlin wanted to cathartically dispel the ghost of the last World War.

The actual design of the memorial was significant as well, of course. (Figure 11) A competition was held to select the new design, as was the case with all of the examples in this text. In this case it was an international competition and the winner was an American, Peter Eisenman. The design that Eisenman and Richard Serra came up with was of a vast expanse of monoliths on a grid which would represent the graves of the Jewish dead. The actual entries of the competition were quite emotionally charged, and speak to the degree to which the issue of the design was politically charged. Possibly the most ghoulish design was of a simple container, like a silo, large enough to contain the blood of all the Jewish dead.¹⁷⁷ Of course Germans wanted to make a political statement of responsibility, but not to frighten their children.

This is an exemplary case of how ideas and aesthetics work together and how politics plays a part in the creation of architecture. Architecture is read by the German and the world population, and hence politicians desire to generate the correct thoughts through the reading. They take great care then in ensuring that a memorial sends the correct message.

3. National Political District, Spreebogen

The German sense of apology is also notable in their design of the new political district for Berlin or “government ribbon”.¹⁷⁸ (see Figure 12) Once they had decided to move the capitol back from the provisional capitol of Bonn, a

¹⁷⁶ The issue of the concept for the memorial and the competition for the design is discussed in Elanor Heartney, “Berlin: Future Perfect?”, 108.

¹⁷⁷ Michael Wise discusses the various designs entered in the competition at length in *Capital Dilemma*, 147-54.

¹⁷⁸ A concise description of the area is offered in Martin Kieren, *New Architecture Berlin 1990-2000*, 39. Many of the individual buildings of the “ribbon” are described as well, noting the transparency of design that reflects the transparency of government.




Figure 12. Model of Spreebogen design, Berlin. From Michael Wise, *Capital Dilemma*, plate 27.

chronic set of issues were brought back to the forefront of German politics. These problems began with the initial design of the provisional political headquarters in Bonn in the early 1950s.

The design of their provisional capitol followed close on the heels of their rearmament. The Germans were still quite tentative in the degree to which they wanted to express their nationalism. This was again brought to the forefront in their architecture. The buildings of the Bonn government were cautious, even apologetic. Some German diplomats, upon seeing the new headquarters, thought it may be necessary to let visitors know that the place was a center of government and not just a college campus. The buildings were low and plain, with a lot of glass and minimal embellishment. Art decorating the interiors was not dramatic, and more than half of it was by foreign artists, thus avoiding the question of whether the art inside would show too much national pride.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹ Michael Wise, *Capital Dilemma*, 31-38.

Now, with the design of a new political district in Berlin, the argument for a stronger Germany is coming to the fore again. Some critics say that the new designs should not be so apologetic, as they were in Bonn. In fact, some bluntly say that Germany needs to regain her pride, and to express this through her architecture. A new architecture should not be minimalist, but should be bold and state the strength of the German nation to the world. These views have not won the day, though they have been heard.¹⁸⁰

The design of central Berlin was through a competition, as the two examples before were. The competition came down to two entries, in fact, which represented the two poles of the debate on architecture. An East German team submitted a traditionalist and substantial design for the area which would hearken back to the older Germany, while a West German team submitted a modern design which was lighter and more open. The political dialog went on much as in the previous examples with the Germans wanting to hide from their past or apologize for it. However, an added political twist was an internal one. There was some degree of lobbying for the East German design simply because it was East German. The newly reunited country wanted to welcome their new brothers by awarding them the design. This was not enough to push the jury to accept their design in the end, though.¹⁸¹

Philosophically, the East Germans obviously wanted to make a change from the modernist designs of communism, while the West Germans wanted to forget that past and were not hampered by a desire to break away from the recent occupation of communism. This is another example of how people express their delight with political change in the form of architectural change.

Another interesting note on the nature of architectural change is a comparison to Hitler's designs for Berlin. The new design would be a linear area cutting through part of Berlin and crossing the Spree River twice symbolically stitching together East and West Berlin in a symbolic gesture of urban planning.

¹⁸⁰ Michael Wise, *Capital Dilemma*, 57-63.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 57-64.

Hitler similarly had a swath of Berlin which would sweep through the city in a grand statement. Hitler's design was, of course, much bigger than the current design as Hitler had a penchant for doing everything to a huge scale. Two main differences between the designs indicate a departure, though, which is likely intentional. First, the new design is at ninety degrees to the fascist design. Second, the new design is in a modernist style, while Hitler's plan was to be grand and classical. This is again an indication of how design style change expresses a separation from a past governmental structure.^{182 183}

Though the transparency of the modern architectural design indicated a transparency of government, some Germans still opine that the architecture is too overbearing. In fact, some who visit the political district say that the architecture is quite powerful and looks like an expression of German prowess in architecture and pride of their accomplishment.¹⁸⁴

4. Conclusion – Aesthetics and Power in Berlin

These three examples from a joined Berlin illustrate how fundamental changes of politics affect the arts and architecture of a city. The architecture of a nation is perceived by many as a statement of its politics, which is why the Germans have been so concerned over the image they will portray in their new capitol. The underlying themes through this discourse have been architecture and remembrance, internationalism through the aesthetic, the aesthetic and political importance of site, and finally the relationship of aesthetics to ideology.

National sentiment through architecture and remembrance came to light in each of the examples, but most vividly in the Holocaust memorial design. This monument is obviously a source of remembrance and the debate on the subject is what, in fact, the Germans want to remember and more to the point what the

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Frederic Spotts, *Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics* (New York: Overlook Press, 2003), 357-68.

¹⁸⁴ Discussion with Oberstleutnant Ekkehard Stemmer, German Air Force, conducted August 22, 2004. The Colonel said that though he sees the transparency of the buildings as a good aesthetic for Berlin, some Germans still think that the massive buildings of the political district are too powerful of a statement for the new Germany.

want the world to see them as remembering. This topic showed through in the government district and Reichstag design as well. The Germans wanted to demonstrate through their architecture that they remembered their heritage (for the people of Germany) and that they would not repeat their mistakes (for the rest of the world).

In the vein of humility, the Germans also dealt with their design in an international arena. The designs were all up for international competition, and indeed two of the three mentioned here were eventually won by foreigners, the Reichstag by an Englishman, and the memorial by an American. Furthermore, there was a great deal of discussion about accepting an East German design, to symbolically include their eastern brothers in the new designs.

The symbolic aesthetic importance of site was most prominently displayed in the example of the Holocaust memorial, and I shall not reiterate here, but there was also precedent in the design for the government district. The mirroring of and separation from Hitler's designs for Berlin were certainly recognized as important attributes to the architects in the competition as well as the politicians who finally decided on the design.

The final theme that bears mention here is the relationship of aesthetics to ideology. It has been illustrated by each example how the ideology of politicians of the present affect the design of the architecture of their time. Though some believe that one aesthetic inherently relates to an ideology, it is simply not so. The Germans have simply used their designs to separate themselves from their fascist and communist past, while maintaining a link with their cultural history.

Berlin is a new old city as are many in eastern Europe and burgeoning democracies throughout the world. Though no one argues that architecture can cause democracy, these examples show how politicians use aesthetics to remember and to separate from a political past. The public debate on the subject then illustrates that the citizens are a part of this philosophy and desire their politics to be reflected in their structures that will represent their city and their

nation to the world. Their national sentiment is improved by their national architecture, and they want to ensure that the correct sentiment is expressed to the rest of the world.

B. PRAGUE

Prague has not had the profound change of public architecture that reflected the change of government in Berlin, but there has been significant construction in the city since the Velvet Revolution of 1989. The private companies that have elected to build in the city have left a different democratic mark on the city than in the public example of Berlin, though, as one would expect with the difference in architectural clients.

The client of a piece of architecture is as important to the design of the building as the architect, as has been demonstrated in several examples throughout Prague. The client, in this case more private concerns than public, has a vision of a project and holds the purse strings and the final say on the artistic merit of a building. Additionally, both the architect and the local building codes have no small amount of influence on the eventual form of a building. So the interplay between these opposing human forces is the environment from which a building springs forth.

Hence the democratic design of the buildings in Prague. As new investors come to invest in the new Czech Republic, some of them want to build and work in Prague, and others erect buildings as only as an investment. These investors make their mark through the construction of the new structures of Prague and the people will have control of this through government regulation as stated before.

Additionally, the public has become more vehement in their attitudes about what they want to see in Prague, expressing their opinions about where they want their aesthetics to lead.¹⁸⁵

1. Prague Architecture

¹⁸⁵ Public opinions on the development of Prague will be further elucidated throughout the chapter. See especially the references to the public debate in the section "Post 1989 Architecture."

Prague has basically developed, like most European cities, as a set of concentric rings. The central core is the oldest construction, including examples of Gothic, Renaissance, Romanesque and other historical styles of architecture. The next ring is one of more modern architecture and examples of communist architecture, and the outer ring contains much of the post communist suburbanization.¹⁸⁶

Damage to Prague during the Second World War was minimal, especially when contrasted to that in Berlin. Additionally there have been few natural disasters to alter the architecture of the city. This left much of the urban character of the city intact and makes the national citizen more attached to the skyline. Furthermore, there have been few interventions into the cityscape on the part of the past rulers of Prague. "The worst [architectural] 'massacre' that Prague has suffered was actually brought about toward the end of the 19th century by its own city officials." That was the time when the city officials decided to widen the streets of the old Ghetto in a similar, though smaller, fashion to the intervention in Paris.¹⁸⁷

This relatively unadulterated cityscape was taken over by the communists, and they made no radical changes either. There was some destruction to make way for communist structures, though, like the demolition of the Tesnov railway station.

[The Tesnov railway station] was truly an international attraction. The reason for razing the station was so clear and rational that even the . . . preservation groups could hardly counter it: It stood close to the Communist Part Central Committee building and thus

¹⁸⁶ For a discussion of the rings of Prague Architecture see Ludek Sýkora, "Changes in the internal spatial structure of post-communist Prague," *GeoJournal* 49 (1999), p. 79-89. Sýkora actually cites five separate rings in his article, but they fall in to the categories listed in this text. There is also a discussion of the history of Prague urbanization in Michal Kohout, Vladimír Slapeta, and Stephan Templ, *Prague: 20th Century Architecture*, 1st English ed. (Praha; New York: Zlatý rez; Wien; Springer, 1999), 1-16.

¹⁸⁷ Daniel Kummermann, "City's Architecture has Endured War, but will it Survive Freedom?" *The Prague Post* (March 1, 1995). The intervention in this case was not nearly as extensive as the one in Paris.

blocked what could be a very convenient parking lot. Adding insult to injury, the cleared area was never used.¹⁸⁸

One of the most significant and controversial works perpetrated by the communist regime was the construction of the panelak housing in the outer ring. These were concrete prefabricated pre-stressed panels assembled into housing blocks for the people. The communist assumption of equality of the workers meant that doctors may live next to a newly released convict. This created an interesting dynamic from the capitalist point of view, as the result was nothing like the debacle of some inner city housing projects on 1970's U.S.A.¹⁸⁹ They were where everyone lived, and though they are not the most sought after real estate in Prague, there is still no poor social stigma associated with living in the panelak.¹⁹⁰

The panelak are examples, in fact, of how Soviet Realism was accepted more readily in Prague than in Berlin. Though there was only one significant example of the style in the downtown area, that of the Hotel International, the modern style of Soviet architecture can be seen in the outskirts of the city in these housing areas. The reason that the new style was more widely accepted in Czech than in the DDR was two fold. First, the Prague architectural community had embraced modern architecture, more specifically cubism, as a style of their own before they were occupied by the Soviets. In this way, Socialist Realism, a more modern style, was more acceptable than in the DDR where the national style had gone from the Wilhelmine to classicism to the neoclassicism of Hitler.¹⁹¹ Second, the architecture of the central city, having survived the war,

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Note specifically St. Louis' Pruitt Igoe projects that were torn down in 1972 after they became the example of how social decay was perpetuated by architecture. Many design flaws contributed to disuse, as well as vandalism and other crimes in the complex.

¹⁹⁰ Sean Hanley, "Concrete Conclusions: the discrete charm of the Czech panelak," *Central Europe Review* (v. 0, no. 22, 22 February, 1999)

¹⁹¹ This progression can be seen in George Mosse, *The Nationalism of the Masses*. The nationalists use the Bismarck Towers to begin with then progress to the more neoclassical monuments mentioned in Chapter III.

was left alone, so the heart of the city was not disturbed by Socialist Realism as East Berlin was.¹⁹²

2. Post 1989 Architecture

Due to this history and the lack of architectural destruction the citizens of Prague are concerned about their architectural pieces as well as the character of the city. They seek maintenance of their urban character through a development of appropriate architecture in their city. This is where the debate begins for Prague. What is an appropriate style, placement, or mass for new additions to the cityscape? And more vehemently, what is inappropriate?

There have been several government agencies that have taken a role in preserving the character of Prague and hence determining what is appropriate and forbidding what is not. The mayor of Prague formed a council for architecture planning and preservation in the 1990s. In addition there is a city monument protection office that works with the State Institute for Protection of Historical Monuments, and a state listing of "heritage buildings."¹⁹³ Ludek Sýkora, a lecturer at Prague's Charles University and Prolific author on the subject of post-communist urban development stated, "the entire core is an urban historic reserve protected by law. The protection involves [the] streetscape and over one third of all buildings in the core."¹⁹⁴

In addition to government protection, there are public interest groups that lobby these government agencies on their opinions on Prague architecture. One such group is the Society for Old Prague, who professes thoughtful design for new buildings as well as preservation of the past. "They did not aim to renounce modern architecture but wanted it to be harmonious with the historical surroundings."¹⁹⁵

¹⁹² This dilemma between Czechoslovakia and the DDR is noted in Anders Åman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era*, 66.

¹⁹³ These agencies are mentioned in David Friday, "Protecting the Past," *The Prague Post* (October 16, 2002) in reference to how citizen preservation groups interact with the government.

¹⁹⁴ Ludek Sýkora, "Changes in the Internal Spatial Structure of Post-communist Prague," 84.

¹⁹⁵ David Friday, "Protecting the Past," *The Prague Post* (October 16, 2002)

In fact there has been a significant amount of modernization in Prague in addition to the preservation efforts. As Sýkora notes:

In the 1990s, the three most visible processes of urban change in Prague have been (1) the commercialization of the urban core, (2) the revitalization of some inner city neighborhoods, which has taken the form of commercialization and gentrification, and (3) residential and commercial suburbanization in the outer city.¹⁹⁶

This modernization is worrisome to the interest groups involved, but not antithetical. As one Czech architect said, “we need to defend and preserve the history we have. At the same time it makes no sense to build copies of old buildings.”¹⁹⁷ This sentiment is mirrored by a second architect who states “Prague cannot stay as a place where tourists come and say, ‘Oh, this is what European cities looked like hundreds of years ago.’”¹⁹⁸ Basically, the architects agree that there needs to be a plan for the future of Prague, though it does not yet seem to exist.¹⁹⁹

One problem in developing this plan is in the nature of capitalization of the Czech Republic. The architecture that has been built has been office space for foreign investors as well as some development of living quarters for the more affluent population. The problem Czechs have with foreign investors is that they are not generally concerned with maintaining the architectural flavor of Prague. “Decisions made by people thousands of miles away are usually more focused on return on investment than on the look of a building that they might never see.”²⁰⁰

There has been renovation of existing buildings as well as new construction. The renovation projects have ranged from strict renovations of

¹⁹⁶ Ludek Sýkora, “Changes in the Internal Spatial Structure of Post-communist Prague,” 83.

¹⁹⁷ Architect Jan Kasl quoted in Frank Forrest, “Standing Still,” *The Prague Post* (November 20, 2002)

¹⁹⁸ Architect Milan Urban quoted in *ibid.*

¹⁹⁹ This sentiment is noted by Jakob Cigler in Frank Forrest, “Standing Still,” as well as other architects throughout the article.

²⁰⁰ Frank Forrest, “Standing Still”

historical sites to interior redesigns of classic structures, to change their use but not appearance, to new additions to historic buildings.²⁰¹ Some of this renovation is still a concern for the preservationists of Prague's character though. For instance, "the construction of attic flats constitutes a creeping but ultimately massive change of Prague's ancient roofline. The adaptations often involve the addition of new windows or skylights which . . . have damaged roofs dating back to the 14th century."²⁰²

The area of debate in the city is in the urban core, for the most part, as the people see that most historic core as the area where character should be maintained. Ironically, though, the center of town has diminished in Czech character since the invasion of capitalism into the society. The tourist industry has taken this central area that was representative of Prague Architecture and turned it in to something kitschier. Regular Prague shops have been replaced by a mix on high-priced hotels, souvenir shops, and restaurants. People are seen wearing pictures of Mozart or Franz Kafka on t-shirts.²⁰³ As a matter of fact, some residents are afraid to go in to Wenceslas Square at night due to the proliferation of drug dealers and prostitutes that come out.²⁰⁴

Vlado Milunic, co-architect of the famed "Dancing Building" in Prague, is not enthusiastic about some of the changes since 1989. He opines that the capitalist architecture can be as bad as the communist architecture, saying "the construction of soulless office blocks, supermarkets, industrial zones, and colonies of vulgar little houses is just as debilitating as the Communist-era construction of giant housing estates, culture palaces, and motorways."²⁰⁵

²⁰¹ Some examples are Langhans Palace in Prague 1, and Mueller's villa in Stresovice mentioned in Johanna Elanova "RE Architecture" *Prague Post* (May 20, 2004) an interesting article discussing the Prague architectural exhibit *Archifest*.

²⁰² David Friday, "Protecting the Past."

²⁰³ THR, "Prague Overwhelmed by Kitsch, American Daily Writes," *CTK National News Wire* (March 11, 2004).

²⁰⁴ "False Glitter of Prague Wenceslas Square," *CTK National News Wire*, June 11, 2004

²⁰⁵ Quoted in THR, "Prague's Architecture is Improving, Architects say," *CTK National News Wire* (March 15, 2004).

3. The Nationale Nederlanden Building (Dancing Building)

Arguably the most famous post-1989 building in Prague is the Dancing building, a work of private architecture designed by an American as well as a Czech architect, and funded by a Dutch investor. So the obvious question is: what could this building possibly have to do with Czech national sentiment? The answer is best articulated in terms of a past example:

At one public presentation at Mánes, Tomáš Notovný, the grandson of the man who built Mánes, said that when his grandfather built Mánes people hated it, they were outraged; they said he was killing the city. He said, "I think this building will be the same . . . People will hate it for two to three years, but if a foreigner comes and says he hates it they will slap his face."²⁰⁶

Though there have been no reports of face slapping as a result of architectural debate in Prague, this sentiment seems to have held true.²⁰⁷ People like the building and it's representation of the city and the republic, as has been shown in the past.

Through this historical background of the city, there remained an empty lot as one of the chief intersections of the city. Perhaps it is an appropriate reminder of the legacy of communist neglect that the corner remained empty since World

War Two when the previous structure was demolished by an Allied bomb. The communists never created a feasible design for the area and hence it remained in neglect until their fall.²⁰⁸

When the design team of Frank Gehry and Vlado Milunic entered the scene with financial investment of the Dutch firm Nationale-Nederlanden, there had already been several proposals for the site, including some from Milunic

²⁰⁶ Frank Gehry and Vlado Milunic, Fialova, Irena, ed., *Dancing Building* (Prague, CZ: Zlatý Rez, 2003), 75.

²⁰⁷ Examples of Czech satisfaction with the Dancing Building are numerous. See the quote below from the president of the Society for Old Prague.

²⁰⁸ Frank Gehry and Vlado Milunic, Fialova, Irena, ed., *Dancing Building*, 39-43




Figure 13. Nationale Nederlanden Building, Prague (left) in context with a neighboring building. From Maggie Toy, ed., *Beyond the Revolution*.²⁰⁹

himself.²¹⁰ None of them were what was needed in Prague: a serious design with a break from the communist past, as was noted earlier.²¹¹ So the new design would be one that would ideally represent Prague as they wanted to be represented.(Figure 13.)

With this in mind, the design team sought to bring the public in to the discussion of the design and to offer their opinions on the building as the design progressed. In fact, according to Milunic, the client insisted that the entire design process must be transparent.²¹² There was a significant response and there

²⁰⁹ Maggie Toy, ed., *Beyond the Revolution* (London: Academy Group, 1996)

²¹⁰ Three prominent proposals included two post-communist towers, and one more fanciful design, resembling a Czechoslovak Joan of Arc. Vlado Milunic, *View into the Black Kitchen*, 1991.

²¹¹ This is the thesis of *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe* noted in Chapter II.

²¹² Frank Gehry and Vlado Milunic, Fialova, Irena, ed., *Dancing Building*, 58

were arguments both in favor and against the design as it progressed.²¹³ Some thought the two towers of the modern design looked like a crushed can of Coke and represented the horrors of capitalism that some in the Czech Republic feared.²¹⁴

Others, though, joined the clients and the design team in the vision of a dancing couple. This concept was adapted from some of the early designs of Milunic, who used the duality concept of yin and yang, static and dynamic, man and woman to portray post-communist Prague.²¹⁵ They perceived the building as representative of a “society burst into motion.”²¹⁶ From the beginning concept, this was the program that spurred on the design of the building. Gehry envisioned this aesthetic metaphor, though he did not voice the idea in fear of the repercussions that may result if Czechs perceived him as importing Hollywood into the Prague architectural landscape.

The resulting building is widely viewed as successful and has become somewhat of an icon for post-communist Prague. Katerina Beckova, president of the Society for Old Prague is even fond of the building saying it is, “one of the few successful examples of a new building located in the city center.”²¹⁷

This brief history of the design of what became known as the “Dancing Building” shows how a new building, and a private construction at that, has become an architectural icon for the new Czech Republic. It is an example of how stylistic metaphors to the past are not important to the national sentiment that is derived from a piece of architecture. The sentiment is derived from the rhetoric surrounding the building and how it is received by the public. Perhaps it was because the people wanted something new, or because the contrasting style

²¹³ Ibid., 25-26

²¹⁴ Wilfred Dechau, “Ein Amerikaner in Paris,” *Deutscher Bezeitung* 8, 1996, cited in Frank Gehry and Vlado Milunic, Fialova, Irena, ed., *Dancing Building*, 69.

²¹⁵ Lance Crossley, “Capturing Life in Architecture: Yugoslavian-Czech Architect Makes Waves with his Buildings,” *The Prague Post* (15 August 2001).

²¹⁶ Frank Gehry and Vlado Milunic, Fialova, Irena, ed., *Dancing Building*, 68.

²¹⁷ David Friday, “Protecting the Past.”

aesthetically fit into the architectural landscape of Prague, but the “Dancing Building” has become a representation of the city that many take national pride in.

4. Conclusion – Prague Architecture in the New Era

This section has shown that citizens of Prague interact with their government through their attempts to preserve the architectural heritage of their city. The political rhetoric mentioned in the earlier chapters was expressed by the people of Prague by their use of the democratic process. They lobbied their government officials causing a change in the architecture of Prague through a change in legislation. This example of democracy working for the people is another way that architecture is symbolizing the democratic process in Prague. In other words, this is a reflection of how the previous examples of national sentiment have played out in the post-communist era of architecture and politics.

C. CONCLUSION – POST 1989 ARCHITECTURE AND POLITICAL POWER

This democratic action has been seen in both Prague and Berlin through the course of this chapter. Both post-communist capital cities have listened to the desires of the citizens and balanced the political desires of the elite to come up with a new architecture to represent them.

In Prague, this representation is through the government agencies that control the planning and the aesthetics of the city while in Berlin the architecture is more directly affected. The designs in Berlin are actually government projects that have been hotly debated by the population of eastern and western Germany alike. Though there has been some difference between the two halves of Germany as well as between Germany and the Czech Republic, it is interesting here to note the similarities.

As Åman predicted in his book, there has been a desire for a change of aesthetics that has gone along with the political change.²¹⁸ The change has perhaps been more publicized in the German case, but has been no less evident

²¹⁸ Anders Åman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era*,

to the citizens of Prague. They have been as vehement about their architectural heritage as Berliners have been about their aesthetics for a new government. The resulting discussions in both cases have shown the desire for change as well as the democratic political process that has brought it to fruition. The notable comparison, though, is that the style used in the two democracies is different. In the case of Berlin, the democratic people have chosen a modern style to leave their wartime past behind them. In Prague, on the other hand, they have chosen to maintain the aesthetic integrity of their city and have focused more on preservation. Czechs have broken with their communist past by reflecting on the times before the Soviet Union.

So the examples also demonstrate how political rhetoric in each case has been a developing factor in the role of architectural aesthetics in politics. The rhetoric has been developed by the politicians as well as the populations involved, again reflecting how the interplay is carried out in a democratic polity. The desire to use architecture to create national sentiment and hence a tighter bond between the people has been the goal of the vehicle of architecture.

V. CONCLUSION

Architecture and politics have interacted throughout history. The powerful have continually utilized architecture and other aesthetic instruments to further their programs. This is demonstrated in Europe through the age of Religious power, the transitional period of the Enlightenment, and in the period of nationalism. Finally, the interaction is noted in the latest period of political transition as we would expect in so tumultuous a time.

Architecture and power is the interesting interaction, though. The development of power through aesthetic means is not explainable in concrete terms, but the interaction can be noted through the past political periods. The powerful have manipulated their aesthetic environments in a desire to express some form of ideology on the people. This has been noted by constructive means of aesthetic creation, as well as the destruction of symbols that do not match the desires of the powerful.

Nationalism was the final historical manifestation of political power noted in the study, and perhaps predictably they made extensive use of aesthetics in their rise. They utilized the aesthetics of architecture as part of their national liturgy to call to the national sentiment of the people and join the nation together. The resulting nation-states have been some of the most powerful and cohesive throughout time, while they have also been some of the most barbarous.

The barbarity is likely due to the use of Us and Them in the development of national sentiment. The architectural and aesthetic tools were used among others to develop national sentiment and bring about national states. The other primary tool of nationalization was the cult of the soldier, that used aesthetic instruments to glorify battle and the military and joined the definition of the Other in creating hatred in the nationalists.

Prague and Berlin were finally explored as testaments to current political and architectural change in Europe. They were seen to have noted the political

change through a change in architecture, though the style differed in the two cases. Of course, there is also a difference in the two cases' architectural development since 1989. In Prague there has been a vast development of commercial architecture, but not as much debate on the government structures. In Berlin, on the other hand, the debate has been more on the government structures than on the private ventures and the character of the city. The difference was one of forgetting the political past versus remembering the more distant past of democracy.

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